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INTRODUCTION 
 
Driven by internationalization efforts such as those that accompanied 
the global efforts to combat the illicit drug trade, international law enforcement 
efforts by the United States have developed markedly over the past few 
decades.1  Scholars note that “[p]olicing transnational crime has evolved from 
a limited and ad hoc assortment of police actions and extradition agreements to 
a highly intensive and regularized collection of law enforcement mechanisms 
and institutions.”2  A notable element of this phenomenon has been the 
increased need by domestic law enforcement agencies to conduct 
extraterritorial law enforcement operations.3  This is especially so in areas of 
the world where there is no governmental counterpart willing or able to take 
action.4   
The U.S. response to transnational crime has, however, frequently 
taken on the characteristics of military action—a trend that has worried policy 
makers and senior military officials.5  For instance, in October 2011, the 
Department of Defense General Counsel, the Honorable Jeh Johnson, in public 
remarks, warned against the “over-militarization” of the country’s approach to 
counterterrorism.6  Mr. Johnson stated that “[t]here is risk in permitting and 
expecting the U.S. military to extend its powerful reach into areas traditionally 
reserved for civilian law enforcement in this country.”7  Regarding areas 
traditionally reserved for civilian law enforcement, the principal legal advisor 
in the U.S. Department of Defense further opined that “[t]he military should 
not and cannot be the only answer.”8   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION 
AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 154–55 (2006). 
2 Id. at 3 (footnote omitted). 
3 Id. at 169 (“The global reach of U.S. law enforcement also substantially expanded in 
the 1990s with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the cold war.”).  See also, generally, 
ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. 
CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (1993) (analyzing the relationship between U.S. foreign policy 
and U.S. law enforcement). 
4 JEREMY HAKEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD, at v (2011) (analyzing twelve different types of illicit trade—drugs, 
humans, wildlife, counterfeit goods and currency, human organs, small arms, diamonds and 
colored gemstones, oil, timber, fish, art and cultural property, and gold— 
and finding that “it can be said that these profitable and complex criminal operations originate 
primarily in developing countries, thrive in the space created by poverty, inequality, and state 
weakness, and contribute to forestalling economic prosperity for billions of people in countries 
across the world”). 
5 See infra Part IV (analyzing U.S. military activity and the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC)). 
6 See Peter Finn, Pentagon Lawyer Warns of Militarized Approach to 
Counterterrorism, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-lawyer-warns-of-
militarized-approach-to-counterterrorism/2011/10/18/gIQAfbnjvL_story.html. 
7 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
8 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also Micah Zenko & Michael A. Cohen, 
Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure than Washington Thinks, 91 
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This trend of militarization in the approach to combatting transnational 
crime is not a new one, nor are the admonitory pronouncements of senior 
officials seeking to constrain it.  Much of the resistance to this trend is rooted 
in practical considerations, such as those of various military officers who have 
observed a negative effect “on the military’s readiness and war-fighting 
capabilities from engaging in direct or indirect law enforcement 
missions . . . .”9  The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has noted that 
“‘[t]he extent of degradation depends on a number of factors . . . . [but that] [i]t 
can take up to 6 months for a ground combat unit to recover from a peace 
operation and become combat ready.’”10  With such missions expanding in 
frequency, the result is that, “the United States military may not be 
immediately or fully available for major theater warfare.”11  The deleterious 
nature of this trend was underscored in 1985 by Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger when he warned that “[r]eliance on military forces to accomplish 
civilian tasks is detrimental to both military readiness and the democratic 
process.”12  Other commentators have likewise noted that militarized responses 
to transnational crime can also have nocuous effects that are ultimately 
counterproductive.13  In the words of E.M. Forster:  “[S]oldiers put one thing 
straight, but leave a dozen others crooked . . . .”14 
In addition to those important policy considerations are numerous 
complex legal considerations relating to the appropriateness of military force 
and the capabilities or limitations of civilian agencies.  The interplay of 
national security with transnational crime only deepens the profound legal 
dilemma that policymakers and international actors must confront.15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
FOREIGN AFF. 79, 81 (2012) (“Because of the chronic exaggeration of the threats facing the 
United States, Washington overemphasizes military approaches to problems (including many 
that could best be solved by nonmilitary means).”).   
9 Michael T. Cunningham, The Military’s Involvement in Law Enforcement: The Threat 
Is Not What You Think, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 699, 711 (2003). 
10 Id. (quoting NAT’L SEC. & INT’L AFFAIRS DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/NSIAD–96–14, PEACE OPERATIONS: EFFECT OF TRAINING, EQUIPMENT, AND OTHER 
FACTORS ON UNIT CAPABILITY, 2–3 (1995)). 
11 Id. (footnote omitted). 
12 STEPHEN P. HOWARD, THE MILITARY WAR ON DRUGS: TOO MANY ASSETS, TOO FEW 
RESULTS 21 (2001), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA407744 
(quoting CTR. FOR DEF. INFO., THE PENTAGON’S WAR ON DRUGS: THE ULTIMATE BAD TRIP 1 
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
13 See ROBERT MANDEL, DARK LOGIC: TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL TACTICS AND 
GLOBAL SECURITY 168 (2011) (“The militarization of anticrime initiatives can alienate citizens 
against their government, reduce support for anticrime and law-and-order initiatives, and 
ultimately increase political and social turmoil.”). 
14 E.M. FORSTER, A PASSAGE TO INDIA 172 (Oliver Stallybrass ed., Penguin Books 
2005) (1924). 
15 MANDEL, supra note 13, at 19 (“Indeed, the nature of transnational criminal activity 
makes the bureaucratic dividing line between narrow law-and-order issues and broader 
national defense concerns increasingly artificial and difficult to delineate, causing, in turn, vital 
security threats to fall between the bureaucratic cracks . . . .”).  See also Cunningham, supra 
note 9, at 701 (noting that as the problems faced by the country grew more complex and 
dangerous, “[c]ivilian law enforcement agencies were perceived to be unable to handle the 
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Nonetheless, the perceived success of many military operations and the skill 
with which military operations can be carried out demonstrates why 
policymakers and political leaders in the United States frequently turn to the 
military in difficult situations.16  It is undeniable that the U.S. Armed Forces 
are uniquely capable and well-resourced organizations able to perform a wide 
range of complex missions in non-permissive environments.  Accordingly, 
military assets have been called upon to address an ever-increasing number of 
challenges that would normally be addressed by civilian agencies.17  In recent 
years, the U.S. military has played a prominent role in domestic disaster relief, 
international development, and—importantly for the purposes of this Article—
the U.S. response to transnational crime.   
A resort to military assets can be practical on multiple levels.  But aside 
from the myriad practicalities which ordinarily compel national leaders to 
resort to the most capable organ of state power when difficult situations arise, 
there are also compelling international legal considerations that make the use 
of military force an even more tempting option when dealing with the unique 
challenges posed by transnational criminals operating outside the United 
States.  In fact, as this Article demonstrates, the use of military force may 
frequently be the only option legally permissible under the current state of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
increasing threat from narcotics smuggling, illegal immigration, and terrorism”); Christopher 
A. Donesa, Note, Protecting National Interests: The Legal Status of Extraterritorial Law 
Enforcement by the Military, 41 DUKE  L.J. 867, 868 (1992) (footnotes omitted): 
 
The emerging claim of a “new world order” thus rests on two pillars:  
newfound respect for sweeping principles of international law in relations 
between nations; and increasing willingness to act abroad against individuals 
or private groups to enforce narrower classes of domestic laws that impact 
American interests on a global scale.  The latter category, in effect, 
transforms some categories of law enforcement into national security issues, 
most notably issues such as terrorism and narcotics trafficking.  As national 
security becomes defined as much by law as politics, the military will 
assume an increasing role in law enforcement, particularly overseas.  In turn, 
policymakers must take increasing care to ensure that enforcement actions 
themselves are in compliance with legal norms. 
 
16 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Swoops in to Free 2 from 
Pirates in Somali Raid, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/
world/africa/us-raid-frees-2-hostages-from-somali-pirates.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(discussing how military operations can be successful in the piracy context); Shih Hsiu-chuan, 
Demonstrators Call for Answers on Slain Captain, TAIPEI TIMES (June 08, 2011), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/06/08/2003505239 (discussing how 
military operations can be problematic in the piracy context); Grace Kuo, MOFA Urges U.S. to 
Compensate Taiwan Skipper’s Family, TAIWAN TODAY (July 25, 2011), 
http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=172626&ctNode=445 (discussing the argument of 
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that the United States should compensate the 
family of a Taiwanese sailor who was inadvertently killed by the U.S. military in an anti-
piracy mission). 
17 See generally JOHN Y. SCHRADER, RESEARCH & DEV. CORP., THE ARMY'S ROLE IN 
DOMESTIC DISASTER SUPPORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF POLICY CHOICES (1993) (discussing the 
U.S. military’s role in civil emergencies). 
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international law.  This stems from a dramatic dichotomy in international law 
that tightly constrains the range of conduct permitted during extraterritorial 
civilian law enforcement operations while granting the military (in certain 
circumstances) wide latitude to carry out an almost unlimited range of invasive 
and even lethal activity.18 
At the heart of this issue are the international legal principles related to 
statehood, sovereignty, and territory.  “As a hallmark of statehood, territorial 
sovereignty is the basis of the international system.”19  Buttressing this 
undergirding principle are a series of accompanying prohibitions on actions of 
outside actors, all designed to ensure that each sovereign is able to perform its 
basic functions and to reduce conflict by limiting external interference.  While 
this organizational scheme mitigates conflict in certain respects, it also gives 
rise to problems associated with transnational crime—problems that can be 
conflict-generative in their own right.  Otherwise stated, while sovereignty 
creates a theoretically inviolable domain in which each state may function, it 
can also serve to insulate transnational criminals from justice.   
This Article explicates the international legal framework governing 
State action against transnational crime; it also explores the disparity in what 
international law permits military actors to do in situations of armed conflict 
versus what actions civilians may undertake in the course of extraterritorial law 
enforcement operations.  This Article argues that the trend of militarization in 
the U.S. approach to transnational crime law is, in part, a function of this legal 
disparity and that this trend could be reversed a degree if international law 
recognized a greater degree of flexibility for certain limited categories of 
extraterritorial law enforcement actions by civilian entities.  To that end, it is 
argued that permitting such an exception would simultaneously promote 1) 
policies of refocusing the military on war-fighting by limiting its role in 
combating transnational crime and 2) rights-based approaches and government 
transparency by addressing transnational criminality in a way that comports 
with constitutional due process and international human rights norms.  
Otherwise stated, permitting greater latitude in the international legal 
framework for extraterritorial law enforcement activities conducted by 
civilians—especially for those activities occurring in areas where there is 
effectively no sovereign capable or willing to take action—would benefit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 217–19, 298 (2d ed. 
1994).  See also Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President, The 
President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and 
Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/
olc/warpowers925.htm (“[T]he Constitution vests the President with the plenary authority, as 
Commander in Chief and the sole organ of the Nation in its foreign relations, to use military 
force abroad—especially in response to grave national emergencies created by sudden, 
unforeseen attacks on the people and territory of the United States.”). 
19 THOMAS G. WEISS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 18 (2d. ed. 2012). 
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military readiness while contemporaneously promoting human rights and the 
rule of law.20    
I. TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND UNGOVERNED SPACES 
 
An increasingly challenging trend for governments worldwide is the 
rise of transnational criminal activity occurring in ungoverned spaces,21 such as 
the international criminal lurking abroad and victimizing others from within 
the territory of a country that will not or cannot take action to bring the 
offensive conduct to a halt and seek justice.  In that regard, a persistent 
challenge to international order is the “incapacity of certain states to effectively 
exercise authority over their territories and populations.”22  As Professor Nye 
notes, “While sovereignty [implies] absolute [control of a territory] in the legal 
sense, de facto control by a government within its borders is often a question of 
degree.”23  There are frequent examples of states that are unable to effectively 
carry out basic functions.24  Such weakened states are a source of significant 
concern for governments.  This concern is made evident by statements such as 
those made in the U.S. Army Field Manual on Stability Operations, which 
pointedly notes, “The greatest threats to our national security will not come 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 
24 (2006) (footnoted omitted) ( “[S]tates are recognized by international law as trustees for the 
people committed to their care.  As trustees, they are supposed to operate lawfully and in a 
way that is mindful that the peaceful and ordered world that is sought in international law—a 
world in which violence is restrained or mitigated, a world in which travel, trade, and 
cooperation are possible—is something sought not for the sake of national sovereigns 
themselves, but for the sake of the millions of men, women, communities, and businesses who 
are committed to their care.  These millions are the ones who are likely to suffer if the 
international order is disrupted; they are the ones whose prosperity is secure when the 
international order is secure.”).  See also ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 4 (2011) (footnotes omitted) (“The question of whether 
fundamental human rights are part of the rule of law or are to be considered as a necessary 
supplement to the rule of law is a moot one, given the widespread support in the United 
Nations for a rule of law definition that includes human rights, as well as the customary nature 
of core civil and political rights.”). 
21 See Stewart M. Patrick, Are ‘Ungoverned Spaces’ a Threat?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://www.cfr.org/somalia/ungoverned-spaces-threat/
p21165. 
22 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME TO THE REPORT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 10 (2001). 
23 JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND HISTORY 135 (2d. ed. 1997). 
24 See Robin Geiss, Armed Violence in Fragile States: Low-Intensity Conflicts, Spillover 
Conflicts, and Sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by Third Parties, 91 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 127, 129 (2009). 
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from emerging ambitious states but from nations unable or unwilling to meet 
the basic needs and aspirations of their people.”25     
In the shadow of this phenomenon, the international community is 
confronted with an increasing level of transnational crime in which criminal 
conduct in one country has an impact in another or even several others.26  Drug 
trafficking, human trafficking, computer crimes, terrorism, and a host of other 
crimes can involve actors operating outside the borders of a country which 
might have a significant interest in stemming the activity in question and 
prosecuting the perpetrator.27  “[T]he new transnational crimes take advantage 
of globalization, trade liberalization and exploding new technologies to 
perpetrate diverse crimes and to move money, goods, services and people 
instantaneously for purposes of perpetrating violence for political ends.”28   
The problems of weakened states and transnational crime create an 
unholy confluence that is uniquely challenging.29  When a criminal operates 
outside the territory of an offended state, the offended state might ordinarily 
appeal to the state from which the criminal is operating to take some sort of 
action, such as to prosecute the offender domestically or extradite the offender 
so that he or she may face punishment in the offended state.30  Nonetheless, in 
situations in which a government is unable (or unwilling) to cooperate in the 
arrest or prosecution of a criminal, the offended state has few options for 
recourse.  In such circumstances,  “[s]tates seem increasingly inclined to 
assume sporadic order maintenance functions in the place of disabled 
governments so as to maintain the perceived security threat at a tolerable 
level.”31  Where other sovereigns fail or refuse to act, states can attempt to fill 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 HEADQUARTERS DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-07, STABILITY 
OPERATIONS vi (2008) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-07]. 
26 See MANDEL, supra note 13, at 17 (footnote omitted) (“Transnational organized crime 
has been mushrooming specifically since the early 1990s, as local criminal groups expanded 
across national boundaries and formed tactical and strategic regional and international 
alliances.”).  See also LINDA E. CARTER, CHRISTOPHER BLAKESLEY, & PETER J. HENNING, 
GLOBAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL LAW 22 (2007). 
27 CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 106–07 (2008). 
28 Id. at 22 (quoting Bruce Zagaris, Revisiting Novel Approaches to Combating the 
Financing of Crime: A Brave New World Revisited, 50 VILL. L. REV. 509, 509 (2005)).  See 
also Donesa, supra note 15, at 882 (footnotes omitted) (“Rapid geopolitical changes have 
forced the American government to reevaluate carefully these policies as other nations have 
proven unwilling or unable to deal with challenges to it within their territories.  As a result, the 
United States has demonstrated an increasing willingness to extend the reach of its law 
enforcement in foreign countries.  The executive branch now believes that it is a legitimate 
extension of presidential authority under the Constitution for the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and U.S. military to make arrests on foreign soil, even without the consent 
of the host government.”). 
29 See MANDEL, supra note 13, at 23 (footnote omitted) (“The proliferation of fragile or 
failing states can lead to a host of pernicious consequences, including creating breeding 
grounds for instability and conflict, terrorism, and sinister networks of all kinds . . . .”). 
30 See CARTER, BLAKESLEY, & HENNING, supra note 26, at 70. 
31 Geiss, supra note 24, at 127. 
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the void of this inaction by taking positive action to prevent further criminal 
conduct. 
   
[I]n times of transnational terrorism and transnational criminal 
networks states increasingly perceive state failure as a direct 
threat to their security interests.  They will thus probably be all 
the more inclined to partially fill the control gap and assume 
specific law enforcement functions in place of a disabled 
government so as to keep potential threats under control.32 
 
Yet, for civilian law enforcement authorities, international law imposes 
rules that can be prohibitive.  Thus, it is not surprising that states are more 
frequently inclined to approach transnational crime through the context of 
military action.  In fact, given the constraints on extraterritorial civilian law 
enforcement action, it can be fairly argued that international law frequently 
compels states to explore a militarized option, especially when addressing 
transnational crime in ungoverned spaces.  The roots of this somewhat 
counterintuitive legal predicament can be traced to the international legal 
framework undergirding the organization of the contemporary international 
order.   
II. THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF SOVEREIGNTY, THE PRINCIPLE OF 
NONINTERVENTION, AND THE EXERCISE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION 
 
Any discussion of extraterritorial law enforcement operations and 
transnational criminality must begin with an explanation of the concept of 
sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention.  It has been noted that 
“[s]overeignty and nonintervention are two of the principles that provide order 
in an anarchic world system.”33  These two principles are interrelated in that 
“sovereignty” implies the legal and de facto control by a government over a 
defined territory, whereas “nonintervention” implies a prohibition against 
actions that undermine sovereignty.  The ideas are irrevocably intertwined as 
the latter implies the inviolability of the former.  As an elucidation of these 
principles demonstrates, each is central to an understanding of the legality of 
extraterritorial law enforcement activity. 
 
A. The Legal Construct of Sovereignty 
 
The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War 
in Europe, is generally viewed as the critical moment that gave rise to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Id. at 139.   
33 NYE, supra note 23, at 133. 
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concept of state sovereignty in international relations.34  This view—which 
emerged during that era and which still prevails today—holds that the world is 
divided into discrete territories that are controlled in their entirety by individual 
and co-equal sovereign authorities.35  For each respective sovereign, this 
necessarily implies the absolute authority to enact and enforce the laws within 
that territory36 and, concomitantly, “the exclusion of external actors from 
domestic authority structures.”37  Pursuant to this legal structure, sovereign 
states maintain exclusive control over the territory within their borders.  Robert 
Jackson, in his excellent book on the topic, described it by saying, 
“Sovereignty is an idea of authority embodied in those bordered territorial 
organizations we refer to as ‘states’ or ‘nations’ and expressed in their various 
relations and activities, both domestic and foreign.”38 
In the modern international legal order, states are “the recognized 
actors in the international legal system” and “the major structural units of the 
legal-political order of the planet.”39  And sovereignty, in turn, is the sine qua 
non of statehood.  It serves as a starting point and organizing principle for 
international law and international relations.  A necessary concomitant to this 
basic principle—and one that is central to understanding the limitations on 
extraterritorial law enforcement activity—is the principle of nonintervention. 
B. Nonintervention 
 
In positing what he concedes to be something of a tautology, Brownlie 
has given what is perhaps the best articulation of what he terms the “master 
principle” of nonintervention.40  He notes that “[m]atters within the 
competence of states under general international law are said to be within the 
reserved domain, the domestic jurisdiction, of states.”41  This is reflected in 
Article 2(7) of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, which provides that, aside 
from the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII, nothing in 
the Charter “shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION 
OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 11 (2009).  For an interesting discussion of the 
development of the legal paradigm resulting from the concept of the sovereign state, see The 
State Is Back, Big Time. But Just What Kind of State?, GLOBAL BRIEF (Spring/Summer 2012), 
http://globalbrief.ca/editors-brief-summer-2012/ (“The first decade-plus of this new century 
has seen ample evidence of the return of the State, classical and other.  From national security 
to monetary (Euro) and fiscal (bailout) policy, to the ‘power vertical’ of Asia’s most important 
country, China, the times will continue to be defined by what happens within states and 
between them.”). 
35 RAUSTIALA, supra note 34. 
36 See id. 
37 STEPHEN D. KRASNER, POWER, THE STATE, AND SOVEREIGNTY: ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 193 (2009). 
38 ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY: EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA ix (2007) (footnote 
omitted). 
39 CARTER, BLAKESLEY, & HENNING, supra note 26, at 11. 
40 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (6th ed. 2003). 
41 Id. (footnote omitted). 
10 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 2013 
 10  
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . . ”42  The 
International Court of Justice, in Nicaragua v. United States, noted that “the 
principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly 
in internal or external affairs of other States.”43  Likewise, the U.N. General 
Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation states that “[n]o state [or Group of States] 
has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State.”44   
Like its sister concept of sovereignty, the principle of nonintervention 
is widely recognized as a cornerstone of the international legal order.  But the 
nature of the conduct that might be sufficient to meet the threshold of an act of 
intervention is left undefined in broad articulations of this general rule.  
Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr., has described the broad range of actions that 
might be considered—at some level—to constitute a form of intervention.45  
Such conduct ranges from what he terms “low coercion” (such as a speech 
designed to influence a state’s internal policy) to “high coercion” (such as 
military action).46  Certainly, something so apparent as an armed attack would 
violate the principle of nonintervention and numerous other tenets of 
international law, but an action need not be as overtly violating as that in order 
to run afoul of the principle of nonintervention.  In fact, far more subtle 
conduct has been recognized as violating the principle of nonintervention, 
particularly when such conduct involves matters closely associated with the 
ordinary functions of the sovereign.  Of particular importance are those 
infringements that relate to another sovereign’s domestic legal processes and 
control of its criminal justice apparatus. 
 
  C. The International Law of Jurisdiction and Its Development 
 
Jurisdiction is another core concept in the subject area of state power 
and authority—one that emanates from the foundational concept of 
sovereignty.  In simple terms, “jurisdiction” is defined as “the right to 
prescribe and enforce rules against others.”47  Scholars have noted that 
“[e]xercising jurisdiction involves asserting a form of sovereignty”48 and that 
“[t]he assertion of criminal jurisdiction over a person is amongst the most 
coercive activities any society can take.”49  For this reason, the modern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
43 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27). 
44 G.A. Res. 20/2131, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/20/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965). 
45 See NYE, supra note 23, at 133–35.  
46 Id. 
47 VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (2007). 
48 ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 43 (2d ed. 2010). 
49 Id. at 22. 
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international legal framework delimits a state’s power by subjecting states to 
certain jurisdictional restraints.  These are limitations on a government’s 
jurisdiction to prescribe (to enact law), to adjudicate (to subject persons or 
entities to its law), and to enforce (to compel compliance with its law).50  With 
regard to each of these categories, a rich and complex body of international 
law exists which regulates particular types of juridical behavior on the part of 
states.  That body of law, which has been addressed in depth by this author and 
others,51 allows for a certain degree of latitude in exercising prescriptive and 
adjudicative jurisdiction.  But it is the last of these categories—enforcement 
jurisdiction—that is central to the analysis of the conduct of extraterritorial law 
enforcement operations.   
Enforcement jurisdiction generally refers to a state’s ability “to induce 
or compel compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations, 
whether through the courts or by use of executive, administrative, police, or 
other nonjudicial action.”52  This is because extraterritorial law enforcement 
operations are essentially an exercise in enforcement jurisdiction abroad and 
are generally considered to be “the most intrusive of jurisdictional claims.”53  
As such, the modern international law of jurisdiction serves to tightly constrain 
the exercise of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction in most contexts.  But 
those constraints were not always understood as being equally applicable in all 
circumstances. 
D. Capitulations and the Old System of Extraterritoriality 
 
It is worth noting that the international legal landscape was not always 
characterized by tight constraints on extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction.  
One prevalent exception to the general rule against extraterritorial enforcement 
jurisdiction was found in the ancient practice among sovereigns of granting to 
specific groups within a territory the ability to exercise certain powers within 
their community.  Before the rise of the state and the more developed notion of 
territorial statehood—in which sovereignty implies absolute legal control of a 
territory—it was common practice for states to grant certain categories of 
foreigners special rights and immunities.54  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. 
51 See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, Wings for Talons: The Case for 
the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Sexual Exploitation of Children through Cyberspace, 50 
WAYNE L. REV. 109 (2004) [hereinafter Blakesley & Stigall, Wings for Talons]; Christopher L. 
Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli:  Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in 
the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Blakesley & Stigall, 
Myopia]. 
52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 50, § 401(c). 
53 CRYER ET AL., supra note 48, at 44.  
54 Norman Bentwich, The End of the Capitulatory System, 14 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 89, 
89–91 (1933). 
12 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 2013 
 12  
Powers of this sort were commonly conferred by treaty.  Such treaties 
were widespread in both geographic and temporal terms.  As early as the fifth 
century A.D., commentators note that the Visigoths in Spain conceded to 
foreign merchants a special jurisdictional right to be tried by “judges selected 
from among their own countrymen.”55  This practice was, likewise, recognized 
during the Byzantine Empire, prevailed among the Italian City States, and was 
even a general practice during the Crusades.56  A global review of such treaties 
finds them, at various times, present in Egypt and throughout North Africa, 
Turkey, Persia, China, Siam, and the Malay States.57        
This jurisdictional scheme, based in the ancient notion of “personality 
of law,”58 is, however, most popularly identified with the “capitulations”—the 
voluntary grants of various rights by Ottoman sultans to European sovereigns 
in the sixteenth century, including the right of Europeans in Ottoman territory 
to remain subject to the jurisdiction of their country and immunity from 
Ottoman jurisdiction.59  The rights were initially granted from a more powerful 
to a lesser sovereign and did not, as the term “capitulation” may imply, 
indicate a concession of power and control from a weaker government to some 
stronger power.  
 
Capitulation is derived from the Latin “Caput” or “Capitulum,” 
and its origin is due to the style of earlier grants, which were 
divided into “heads” or articles.  The grantor did not 
“capitulate” in the modern sense, although the inferior legal 
status of the States which are at present regulated by 
Capitulations has encouraged this belief.  In the original 
Capitulations the grantor declares, in grandiloquent terms, the 
importance of his position; it is the grantee who “prays,” or 
“begs,” or “complains,” and the grantor who of his “humanitie 
[sic] and gracious ingrafted disposition” promises redress.60 
 
Indeed, scholars have noted that the Ottoman Capitulations of the 
Sixteenth Century merely recognized the prevailing international practice.  In 
fact, when one of the original treaties of this type was negotiated in 1535 
between Francis I and Suleiman the Magnificent, “the granting state was much 
the stronger of the two.”61  Norman Bentwich, a Professor of International 
Relations in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem during the 1930s, noted that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Nasim M. Soosa, The Historical Interpretation of the Origin of the Capitulations in 
the Ottoman Empire, 4 TEMP. L. Q. 360 (1929–1930) (footnote omitted). 
56 See id. at 360–64. 
57 See Bentwich, supra note 54, at 90.  
58 Id. at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59 Id. 
60 JAMES HARRY SCOTT, THE LAW AFFECTING FOREIGNERS IN EGYPT; AS THE RESULT 
OF THE CAPITULATIONS, WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT viii (1907). 
61 R. G. Surridge & Rebecca Matthews, Extraterritoriality—A Vanishing Institution, 3 
CUM. DIG. INT’L L. & REL. 81, 81 (1934). 
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Turkish authorities had no desire to exercise jurisdiction over “the Christian 
resident alien” and that Ottoman law “was to him what the Ius Civile was to 
the Roman under the Republic—the privilege of the citizen . . . .”62 
As the power of the Ottoman Empire declined and European powers 
increased, the treaties began to acquire the character of unequal treaties by 
which Europeans in Eastern countries were given a special status and were 
“immune from the jurisdiction, taxation, and legislation of the local 
sovereign.”63 
 
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, capitulations had 
acquired an exceptional character, both conceptually and in 
terms of their impact.  Conceptually, the jurisdictional 
concessions contained in capitulations became an exception 
when the international order progressively moved toward the 
principle of territorial sovereignty, which coalesced once the 
European political order abandoned the personal link between 
sovereign and subject as a basis for political organization.64   
 
As Ottoman power declined, the legal landscape of the international 
order was also changing in ways that made the Capitulations less durable.  The 
general practice of allowing countries to exercise a degree of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over its citizens within the territory of another sovereign65 would 
decline at the dawn of the twentieth century. 
 
The capitulatory regime has its origin in a once universally 
observed principle, namely, the principle of “personality of 
law” by which the foreigner carried his own laws wherever he 
went.  In origin, it was the development of a normal procedure; 
it is exceptional now, because with the decline of the city state 
of the middle ages, jurisdiction, throughout all progressive 
nations, has become territorial.  The firmly established theory 
of territorial rights, jus territoriale, by which a state has 
exclusive sovereignty over its territory grafted an anomalous 
character on the capitulatory system.66 
 
In 1933, Bentwich described the capitulatory system as being “out of 
accord with the system of the modern world,” which, by that time, considered 
the vast constellation of territorial states to be organized as a body of coequal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Bentwich, supra note 54, at 89. 
63 Id. at 90. 
64 Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of 
Imposition and Appropriation, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 475, 507 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
65 Id. 
66 Soosa, supra note 55, at 371. 
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sovereigns.67  The capitulatory regime, therefore, declined as the modern 
notion of sovereignty and noninterference coalesced. 
Other noteworthy historic examples of exceptions to this general 
prohibition on extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction include the immunity 
granted to military forces in transit and the practice that was known as “the law 
of the flag.”68  Historically, international law excepted foreign soldiers who 
had been permitted to pass through the territory of another sovereign from the 
jurisdiction of that sovereign.  Vattel noted that when one sovereign granted to 
another the right to allow military forces to pass through its territory, “[t]he 
grant of permission to pass includes a grant of [everything] which is naturally 
connected with the passage of troops,” including “that of exercising military 
discipline on the soldiers and officers . . . .”69  In Vattel’s view, if “the 
licentiousness of the soldiers” should occasion damage within the territory of 
the state that has allowed their passage, such actions gave rise to an obligation 
on the part of the troops’ sovereign to make reparation to the offended state—
but the ability to exercise jurisdiction over the soldiers remained that of the 
sovereign to which the troops belonged.70 
Remnants of this doctrine can be found into the nineteenth century.  For 
instance, this doctrine was also addressed in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
in the case of The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden.71  There, Chief Justice 
Marshall considered the case of a ship named The Schooner Exchange that had 
been captured by France only to find its way again to a U.S. port where, to the 
chagrin of the original owner, it was docked under a French flag and bore the 
name The Balaou.72  In this landmark decision, occasioned by the lawsuit filed 
by the ship’s original owner in an attempt to regain possession, Chief Justice 
Marshall articulated the basic rule that “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Bentwich, supra note 54, at 89. 
68 Steven G. Hemmert, Peace-Keeping Mission SOFAs: U.S. Interests in Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 215, 218–19 (1999). 
69 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 539 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore 
eds., 2008). 
70 Id. at 343.  See also id. at 479–80, noting:  
 
Good order and subordination, so useful in all places, are nowhere so 
necessary as in the army.  The sovereign should exactly specify and 
determine the functions, duties, and rights of military men,—of soldiers, 
officers, commanders of corps, and generals.  He should regulate and fix the 
authority of commanders in all the gradations of rank,— the punishments to 
be inflicted on offenders,— the form of trials, [etc].  The laws and 
ordinances relative to these several particulars form the military code. 
 
Those regulations, whose particular tendency is to maintain order among the 
troops, and to enable them to perform their military service with advantage 
to the state, constitute what is called military discipline.  This is of the 
highest importance. 
 
71 The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
72 Id. at 118. 
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its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.  It is susceptible of no 
limitation not imposed by itself.”73  Notably, however, Chief Justice Marshall 
recognized that there could be exceptions to this rule, such as when the 
sovereign has consented “to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain 
peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their 
respective territories which sovereignty confers.”74  Key examples of this 
exception to the general rule of sovereignty were when “the person of the 
sovereign” entered a foreign country75 or when a sovereign allowed a foreign 
minister to enter its territory.76  Likewise, for purposes of the litigants in The 
Schooner Exchange, another situation in which a sovereign was understood to 
have ceded a portion of his territorial jurisdiction was where the sovereign 
allowed “the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions.”77  As 
the Court noted, “The implied license therefore under which such vessel enters 
a friendly port, may reasonably be construed, and it seems to the Court, ought 
to be construed, as containing an exemption from the jurisdiction of the 
sovereign, within whose territory she claims the rites of hospitality.”78 
Chief Justice Marshall, however, took great pains to emphasize the 
limited scope of such immunity.  He explained that it applied to appendages of 
the foreign sovereign and was not of general application to foreign visitors and 
merchant vessels.79  The general rule of exclusive territorial sovereignty and 
the disallowance of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction remained the 
norm.   
This immunity given to visiting troops—and the concomitant grant of 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction—was the prevailing practice among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Id. at 136. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 137. 
76 Id. at 138.  
77 Id. at 139. 
78 Id. at 144.  
79 Id.  
 
When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as 
business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the 
inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of 
trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and 
would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to 
degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and 
local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country.  
Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption.  
His subjects thus passing into foreign countries, are not employed by him, 
nor are they engaged in national pursuits.  Consequently there are powerful 
motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction of 
the country in which they are found, and no one motive for requiring it.  The 
implied license, therefore, under which they enter can never be construed to 
grant such exemption. 
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most nations of the world until the 1950s.80  As previously discussed, however, 
the twentieth century saw the erosion of this principle in international law.  In 
modern international practice, soldiers abroad in contemporary operations are 
not considered immune from the host nation’s jurisdiction absent some 
agreement by which that sort of jurisdiction is preserved.81  Similarly, with the 
development of the modern idea of territorial sovereignty, the exercise of 
jurisdiction by a foreign sovereign within the borders of another sovereign is 
now anathema.82   
 
E. The Modern Idea of Enforcement Jurisdiction 
 
In contrast to these historic examples, the contemporary international 
law of jurisdiction tightly constrains the exercise of extraterritorial 
enforcement jurisdiction in most contexts.  “The exercise of enforcement 
jurisdiction is an exercise of State sovereignty, and the rule that governs it is 
simple.  No State may exercise its enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of 
another State without that State’s permission.”83  Indeed, the limitations 
particular to the extraterritorial exercise of enforcement jurisdiction are now 
well settled.  In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
noted that “the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law on a 
State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may 
not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.”84  As 
noted, the exercise of power envisioned in this prohibition need not be 
something so dramatic as the use of military force.  Activities such as the 
carrying out of investigations in the territory of another sovereign are 
considered “contrary to the broader principle of non-intervention.”85  On that 
score, most law enforcement activity has been interpreted as being an exercise 
of enforcement jurisdiction and thus an activity that is restricted in its 
unilateral exercise.  Therefore, “a state cannot investigate a crime, arrest a 
suspect, or enforce its judgment or judicial processes in another state’s territory 
without the latter state’s permission.”86  Law enforcement actions such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See Hemmert, supra note 68, at 218–19. 
81 Id. at 220. 
82 See Lorca, supra note 64. 
83 LOWE, supra note 47, at 184. 
84 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 45 (Sept. 7).   
85 D. W. Bowett, Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and 
Resources, in STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND THEORY 555, 567 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. 
Johnston eds., 1983).  See also CRYER ET AL., supra note 48, at 44 (defining “executive (or 
enforcement) jurisdiction” as “the right to effect legal process coercively, such as to arrest 
someone, or undertake searches and seizures.”). 
86 INT’L BAR ASS’N [IBA], REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION 10 (2009), available at http://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/
Task%20Force%20on%20Extraterritorial%20Jurisdiction%20-%20Report%20.pdf. 
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investigations and arrests are, therefore, strictly forbidden absent the consent of 
the sovereign in whose territory the action is to occur.87  
Reflecting this basic rule, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law notes that although a state is generally free to enforce its criminal law 
within its own territory,88 “a state’s law enforcement officers may exercise 
their functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the 
other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state.”89  The comments 
to the Restatement make the requirement of host nation consent clear: 
 
It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, 
that officials of one state may not exercise their functions in the 
territory of another state without the latter’s consent.  Thus, 
while a state may take certain measures of nonjudicial 
enforcement against a person in another state, . . . its law 
enforcement officers cannot arrest him in another state, and can 
engage in criminal investigation in that state only with that 
state’s consent. Within a state’s own territory, the rules 
governing arrest and other steps in criminal law enforcement 
generally apply regardless of the nationality, residence, or 
domicile of the person accused or investigated, subject only to 
defined exceptions for persons enjoying diplomatic or consular 
immunity . . . and to the obligation to observe basic human 
rights . . . .90 
 
The comment also notes that if a state’s law enforcement officials 
exercise their functions in the territory of another state without host nation 
consent, the offended state is entitled to protest and, in certain cases, may even 
receive reparation from the offending state.91   
The basis for such a prohibition on extraterritorial law enforcement is 
not difficult to discern.  The conduct of criminal investigations is an inherent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Bowett, supra note 85.  
88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 50, § 432(1).  The Restatement does note some 
limitations on the ability of a state to enforce laws even within its own territory.  It states: 
 
A state may enforce its criminal law within its own territory through the use 
of police, investigative agencies, public prosecutors, courts, and custodial 
facilities, provided  
(a) the law being enforced is within the state’s jurisdiction to prescribe; 
(b) when enforcement is through the courts, the state has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate with respect to the person who is the target of enforcement; and 
(c) the procedures of investigation, arrest, adjudication, and punishment are 
consistent with the state’s obligations under the law of international human 
rights. 
Id. 
89 Id. § 432(2). 
90 Id. § 432 cmt. b. 
91 Id. § 432 cmt. c. 
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function of the sovereign.  Professor Christopher Blakesley, in his discussion 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction, noted the indissoluble link between criminal law 
and the sovereign:  “At the inception of the nation-state as a sovereign unit, the 
‘king’s peace’ was the ideological tool used to promote the consolidation of 
power against ‘private justice.’”92  And as Jean Bodin wrote, “It is most 
expedient for preservation of the state that the rights of sovereignty should 
never be granted out to a subject, still less to a foreigner, for to do so is to 
provide a stepping stone where the grantee himself becomes the sovereign.”93  
It is, therefore, little wonder that modern governments now forcefully object to 
the unauthorized operations of foreign law enforcement agents within their 
borders. 
The domestic national law of various countries also reflects this 
restrictive view of exercising enforcement jurisdiction abroad.  With regard to 
an extraterritorial arrest, such action is considered to be a use of force in the 
territory of another sovereign94 and is tantamount to abduction.  In such 
circumstances, the Restatement posits that international law requires the person 
be returned.95  If, however, the state from which the person was abducted does 
not demand his return, under the prevailing view the abducting state may 
proceed to prosecute him under its laws. 
Accordingly, while states are afforded a certain degree of latitude in 
exercising prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction,96 restrictions on 
enforcement jurisdiction are markedly constrained and deemed violative of the 
“master principle” of nonintervention.  As Ryngaert notes, “Only the exercise 
of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction—the carrying out of certain 
material acts on another State’s territory—has been deemed to infringe upon 
the principle of non-intervention and, thus, on the sovereignty of a foreign 
State.”97   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY 103 (1992). 
93 JEAN BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE [THE SIX BOOKS OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH] 49 (M.J. Tooley ed. & trans., B. Blackwell 1955) (1576). 
94 Bowett, supra note 85.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 951(a) (2006) (It is a criminal offense 
for anyone “other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attaché [to act] in the United States 
as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Attorney General.”); 28 
C.F.R. § 73.3 (2012) (detailing the requirements for notifications to the Attorney General by 
agents of foreign governments).  These statutes effectively make it a crime in the United States 
for a foreign agent to conduct law enforcement activity within U.S. territory without first 
coordinating with appropriate U.S. officials.   
95 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 50, § 432 cmt. c. 
96 See, e.g., Blakesley & Stigall, Wings for Talons, supra note 51; Blakesley & Stigall, 
Myopia, supra note 51.  See also, generally, Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot, Kiobel and the 
Question of Extraterritoriality (“El Tiempo de los Derechos”, Working Paper No. 2, Sandra 
Kingery, trans., 2013), available at http://conflictoflaws.net/2013/kiobel-and-the-question-of-
extraterritoriality-paper. 
97 RYNGAERT, supra note 27, at 144 (2008). 
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F. Extradition, Lawful Removal, and Mutual Legal Assistance 
 
Given the extraordinary limits on the exercise of extraterritorial 
enforcement jurisdiction, states have, by necessity, developed mechanisms to 
cooperate in transnational criminal matters.  The primary mechanisms used in 
this regard are extradition, lawful removal, and mutual legal assistance.  These 
devices are the principal means by which cooperation in transnational criminal 
matters is requested and afforded. 
Extradition is the mechanism by which one sovereign requests and 
obtains custody of a fugitive located within the jurisdiction and control of 
another sovereign.98  It is an ancient mechanism, dating back to at least the 
thirteenth century, when an Egyptian Pharaoh negotiated an extradition treaty 
with a Hittite King.99  Through the extradition process, a sovereign (the 
requesting state) typically makes a formal request to another sovereign (the 
requested state).100  If the fugitive is found within the territory of the requested 
state, then the requested state may arrest the fugitive and subject him or her to 
its extradition process.101  The extradition procedures to which the fugitive will 
be subjected are dependent on the law and practice of the requested state.102  
When there is no extradition agreement in place, or when applicable 
extradition agreements are inapplicable, a sovereign may still request the 
expulsion or lawful return of an individual pursuant to the requested state’s 
domestic law.103  This can be accomplished through the immigration laws of 
the requested state or other facets of the requested state’s domestic law.104  
Similarly, the codes of penal procedure in many countries contain provisions 
allowing for extradition to take place in the absence of an extradition 
agreement.105  Sovereigns may, therefore, still request the expulsion or lawful 
return of a fugitive from the territory of a requested state in the absence of an 
extradition treaty.106  
A concept related to extradition that has significant implications in 
transnational criminal law is that of aut dedere aut judicare.  This maxim 
represents the principle that states must either surrender a criminal within their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 See CARTER, BLAKESLEY, & HENNING, supra note 26, at 63. 
99 Id. (citing Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986)). 




103 Id. at 101. 
104 Id. 
105 See, e.g., Code de Procédure Pénale art. 308 et seq. (Tunis.); Code de Procédure 
Pénale art. 694 et seq. (Alg.); Code de Procédure Pénale, Loi N° 71-77 (Sen.). 
106 See Special Rapporteur on the Expulsion of Aliens, Preliminary Report on the 
Expulsion of Aliens, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/554 (June 2, 2005) (by 
Maurice Kamto) (footnote omitted) (“International law therefore recognizes the discretionary 
power of each State to grant or refuse entry to its territory.  Equally, international law 
recognizes the right of the State itself to set the conditions for the entry and residence of aliens 
in its territory.”). 
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jurisdiction to a state that wishes to prosecute the criminal or prosecute the 
offender in its own courts.107  Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth-century Dutch 
jurist, first elaborated upon the concept as an obligation in international law:  
  
Grotius’ argument was “that a general obligation to extradite or 
punish exists with respect to all offenses by which another state 
is particularly injured.”  Moreover, a state that had been so 
particularly injured obtained a natural right to punish the 
offender, and any state holding the offender should not 
interfere with that right.  Thus, such a holding state should be 
considered bound to either extradite or punish; there was no 
third alternative.108 
 
Some contemporary scholars hold the opinion that aut dedere aut 
judicare is not an obligation under customary international law but rather “a 
specific conventional clause relating to specific crimes”109 and, accordingly, an 
obligation that only exists when a state has voluntarily assumed the obligation.  
Cherif Bassiouni, however, has posited that, at least with regard to 
international crimes, it is not only a rule of customary international law but a 
jus cogens principle.110  Professor Michael Kelly, moreover, citing Israeli and 
Austrian judicial decisions, has noted that “there is some supporting anecdotal 
evidence that judges within national systems are beginning to apply the 
doctrine on their own.”111   
Even so, a wide array of international instruments now contains 
provisions for aut dedere aut judicare.112  These include all four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions,113 the U.N. Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 See RYNGAERT, supra note 27, at 104. 
108 Michael J. Kelly, Cheating Justice by Cheating Death: The Doctrinal Collision for 
Prosecuting Foreign Terrorists—Passage of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare into Customary Law & 
Refusal to Extradite Based on the Death Penalty, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 491, 496–97 
(2003) (footnotes omitted). 
109 RYNGAERT, supra note 27, at 105.  See also Kelly, supra note 108, at 500 (footnote 
omitted) (“At a minimum, aut dedere aut judicare exists as a general norm of law, 
theoretically binding on all states.”). 
110 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY 
TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24–25 (1995); Kelly, supra note 108, 
at 105, at 500 (footnote omitted) (“At a minimum, aut dedere aut judicare exists as a general 
norm of law, theoretically binding on all states.”). 
111 Kelly, supra note 108, at 502.  
112 Lee A. Steven, Note, Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the 
United States Is in Breach of Its International Obligations, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 425, 447 (1999). 
113 (First) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention I]; (Second) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; (Third) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; (Fourth) Geneva Convention Relative to 
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Bombings,114 the U.N. Convention Against Corruption,115 the Convention for 
the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,116 the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,117 
the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of an 
Armed Conflict,118 and the International Convention for the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.119  
Lastly, aside from mechanisms for the return of fugitives, states have 
also developed mechanisms for requesting and obtaining evidence for criminal 
investigations and prosecutions.  When evidence or other forms of legal 
assistance, such as witness statements or the service of documents, are needed 
from a foreign sovereign, states may attempt to cooperate informally through 
their respective police agencies or, alternatively, resort to what is typically 
referred to as requests for “mutual legal assistance.”120  The practice of mutual 
legal assistance developed from the comity-based system of letters rogatory,121 
though it is now far more common for states to make mutual legal assistance 
requests directly to the designated “Central Authorities” within each state.122  
In contemporary practice, such requests may still be made on the basis of 
reciprocity but may also be made pursuant to bilateral and multilateral treaties 
that obligate countries to provide assistance.123 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287 [hereinafter, collectively, Geneva Conventions]. 
114 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art. 6(4), Dec. 
15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284 (“Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in Article 2 in cases where the 
alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite that person to any of the 
States Parties which have established their jurisdiction . . . .”). 
115 Convention Against Corruption, art. 42(3), opened for signature Dec. 9, 2003, 43 
I.L.M. 37 (“For the purposes of Article 44 of this Convention, each State Party shall take such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in 
accordance with this Convention when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it 
does not extradite such person solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals.”). 
116 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 
U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.  
117 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  
118 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. 
119 Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 
1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243. 
120 See CRYER ET AL., supra note 48, at 102. 
121 Id.  
122 See Thomas G. Snow, The Investigation and Prosecution of White Collar Crime: 
International Challenges and the Legal Tools Available to Address Them, 11 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 209, 226 (2002). 
123 Id. (footnote omitted).  See also U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, MANUAL ON 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS RELATED TO TERRORISM 24, Module 
1.B.6 (2009) (footnote omitted) (“In some countries, the mechanisms of mutual legal 
assistance may be provided for by domestic legislation, which is applied either generally to all 
other States or to designated States on the basis of reciprocity.”). 
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Many countries are able to provide a broad range of mutual legal 
assistance to other countries even in the absence of a treaty.124  In some 
developing countries, however, domestic laws can actually create obstacles to 
effective law enforcement cooperation and mutual legal assistance.  For 
instance, Article 59 of the Libyan Criminal Procedure Code provides as 
follows: 
 
Investigation procedures and their results shall be considered 
confidential. Investigators, prosecution members and their 
assistants or clerks and experts who are related to the 
investigation or attend to their profession or post shall 
undertake not to disclose same.  Anyone who breaches this 
provision shall be punished in accordance with Article 236 of 
the Penal Code.125 
 
According to a filing by the Government of Libya before the 
International Criminal Court, this provision of Libyan law serves to criminalize 
many forms of international cooperation.126  In fact, Libya has argued before 
the International Criminal Court that this provision makes it impossible for 
Libyan authorities to share basic details of domestic Libyan investigations with 
international authorities.127  Such domestic legal obstacles are obviously 
inimical to effective law enforcement cooperation and serve to obstruct mutual 
legal assistance efforts. 
A notable feature of both extradition and mutual legal assistance is that 
each mechanism is designed to respect the sovereignty of other states and 
avoid acts of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction.  Importantly, each takes 
the form of a request from one sovereign to another and relies upon the 
willingness of the requested state for the result to be successful.  Needless to 
say, in situations where the requested state is unwilling or unable to afford 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3512 (2006) (permitting U.S. authorities to provide a broad 
range of mutual legal assistance based on a foreign request and without the requirement of a 
treaty).  See also Code de Procédure Pénale (Tunis.), supra note 105, at art. 331–335 
(permitting mutual legal assistance based on the request of a foreign authority without the 
requirement of a treaty.). 
125 Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/11-
01/11, Application on Behalf of the Government of Libya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC 
Statute, ¶ 39 (May 1, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1405819.pdf (quoting 
Libyan Criminal Procedure Code art. 59). 
126 See id. ¶ 40 (“The practical effect of Article 59 of Libya's Criminal Procedure Code is 
that for the duration of the investigative phase of proceedings, the Libyan prosecution services 
(Prosecutor-General for civilians and Military-Prosecutor for military persons) may only 
disclose summary reports of their investigations to persons who are not involved in the Libyan 
investigative or prosecutorial team.  Disclosure of actual evidence, including witness 
interviews or other documentary evidence, or even details such as witnesses’ names and 
contact details before the case reaches the accusation stage of proceedings, would violate 
[Libyan law].”). 
127 Id. 
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assistance, none of these mechanisms will prove effective.  As a result, such 
mechanisms are incapable of fully addressing the problem of transnational 
criminality in ungoverned spaces.  A review of the legal framework under 
which civilian authorities must address transnational crime, therefore, reveals 
significant limitations and lacunae. 
III. THE U.S. MILITARY AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
In contrast to the restrictions imposed by international law on 
extraterritorial activity by civilian agencies, the military is capable of operating 
outside of U.S. territory in multiple contexts without such onerous legal 
constraints.  In that regard, among the most notable—and visible—examples of 
extraterritorial activity in present times is that of U.S. military operations 
abroad.  Examples range from the nightly raids of insurgent strongholds in Iraq 
and Afghanistan to the lethal targeting of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan.128  
This seemingly unbound ability to engage in extraterritorial activity is possible 
under international law because military activity is, under most circumstances, 
governed by a separate—and vastly more permissive—regime of law.  This 
regime of law is known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). 
Military activity under LOAC is fundamentally different from law 
enforcement activity.  From a functional perspective, military operations 
seeking to neutralize legitimate targets in a combat zone are not seeking to 
enforce their nation’s domestic criminal law, nor are they, in typical 
circumstances, attempting to usurp the legitimate functions of another 
sovereign.  To the contrary, as a general matter, military operations seek to use 
combat power, pursuant to well-recognized legal framework, “to accomplish 
the military objectives that support achieving the conflict’s overall political 
goals.”129   
Understanding the differences in—and limits of—these legal concepts 
is key to a comprehensive understanding of transnational criminal law because 
what is permissible for one actor in one circumstance is strictly prohibited in 
another.  Likewise, what may seem like an expansive grant of authority under 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 See Jane Perlez, Pakistani Army Chief Warns U.S. on Another Raid, N.Y. TIMES (May 
5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/world/asia/06react.html. 
129 HEADQUARTERS DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-0, OPERATIONS app. A, ¶ 
A-2 (2008). 
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A. The Law of Armed Conflict 
 
LOAC is defined as “that part of international law that regulates the 
conduct of armed hostilities.”130  Scholars typically divide LOAC into the 
subcategories of jus ad bellum, the law regulating when the use of military 
force is permissible; jus in bello, the law regulating how military force is 
employed during an armed conflict; and jus post bellum, the law regulating 
post-conflict activities.131 
The starting point for understanding the legal basis for this 
extraordinary ability on the part of military forces is jus ad bellum, the 
international law permitting the use of force.  The U.N. Charter prohibits the 
use of force by states, except in cases of self-defense.132  Article 2(3) of the 
U.N. Charter provides that states “shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and 
justice, are not endangered.”133  Likewise, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 
provides that states “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”134  Nonetheless, the U.N. Charter provides that states may resort to 
armed force for purposes of self-defense135 and when authorized by the U.N. 
Security Council under the provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.136   
While requiring that “belligerents refrain from employing any kind or 
degree of violence which is not actually necessary for military purposes”137 
and to protect civilians who are not engaged in hostilities, LOAC, quite 
obviously, permits states to employ violence and military force to achieve 
permissible military objectives.138  As a general matter, LOAC permits any 
level of lethal and destructive force to be used against lawful military 
objectives (one which, by its location, nature, purpose, or use, is such that its 
destruction offers a military advantage)139 so long as “the incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof” would not “be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 U.S. ARMY INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 11 
(2012) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK] (footnoted omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
131 See RICHARD P. DIMEGLIO ET AL., U.S. ARMY INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 10 (2012) [hereinafter LOAC DESKBOOK]. 
132 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
133 Id. at art. 2, para. 3. 
134 Id. at para. 4. 
135 Id. at art. 51. 
136 LOAC DESKBOOK, supra note 131, at 29. 
137 Id. at 8 (footnoted omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 137. 
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advantage anticipated.”140  As a general rule, anyone engaging in hostilities in 
an armed conflict on behalf of a party to the conflict may be similarly 
targeted.141  LOAC, accordingly, permits large-scale killing and destruction—
even of innocent civilians—so long as the direct target is a lawful military 
target and the civilian deaths are incidental and “proportional.”142 
The level of force permitted under LOAC is extraordinary.  The annals 
of history are replete with examples of the level of violence that war occasions.  
From the campaign of “shock and awe” used against Iraq at the outset of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom143 to the ongoing predator drone strikes that target 
terrorists yet still frequently kill innocent civilians,144 the level and scale of 
violence permitted under LOAC is fundamentally different from the sorts of 
monopolized violence that states may lawfully use in a law enforcement 
context.  As one military officer has noted: 
 
It is important to remember that law enforcement missions are 
inherently different from military missions.  Law enforcement 
agents use force as the last resort.  The military uses deadly 
force as their primary instrument.  Not only is it their primary 
means of settling conflict, militaries use overwhelming and 
indiscriminate force to quickly and efficiently end the conflict.  
This has huge political and social implications on civilians and 
non-combatants.145 
 
Even when acting in self-defense, the sort of force used by states is no 
less extraordinary, most scholars agreeing that the force used in self-defense 
may greatly exceed the force of the initial attack—the measure being what 
force was required to “halt and repulse” the aggressor.146  Kunz takes this even 
further, arguing that once the initial attack has occurred, the attacked state may 
resort to “a justified war, to carry this war to victory, to impose a peace treaty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Protocol I]. 
141 See LOAC DESKBOOK, supra note 131, at 138–39. 
142 Id. at 13. 
143 See, e.g., Harlan K. Ullman, Shock and Awe a Decade and a Half Later: Still 
Relevant, Still Misunderstood, 2 PRISM 79, 81 (2010) (explaining that “shock and awe” meant 
“affecting, influencing, and controlling will and perception,” as related to the Iraq War). 
144 See Michael Martinez, U.S. Drone Killing of American al-Awlaki Prompts Legal, 
Moral Debate, CNN (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/30/politics/targeting-us-
citizens/index.html. 
145 See HOWARD, supra note 12, at 40.  See also Cunningham, supra note 9, at 702 (“The 
military tends to think in terms of ‘complete victory’ over an opponent through the use of 
overwhelming force, which may not be a useful mindset in law enforcement operations.”). 
146 NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 65 
(2010) (quoting Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Addendum to the Eighth Report 
on State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 121, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7 (Feb. 29, 
1980) (by Roberto Ago)). 
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upon the vanquished aggressor . . . .”147  In this view, “[t]he right of self-
defense is . . . a right to resort to war.”148   
 
B. International Human Rights Law and Domestic Constraints  
   
While LOAC does seek to provide protections to civilians during an 
armed conflict, those protections are significantly different in nature from 
those that civilians enjoy under ordinary domestic and international legal 
frameworks.  As noted, the incidental death of innocent civilians is permitted 
under LOAC, as are a wide range of activities that no government would be 
permitted to undertake in other circumstances.  
In contrast with military activities during a war or other armed conflict, 
law enforcement activity takes place in a far more regulated realm, which 
offers individuals subject to state power far more protections.  States 
conducting law enforcement activities do so while respecting the rule of law 
and the cordon of legal constraints embodied in applicable domestic and 
international law.  For instance, at the domestic level, government officials in 
the United States must conduct investigations and law enforcement activity 
while respecting the rights of individuals granted by the U.S. Constitution and 
other relevant statutes.  This means that, absent exceptional circumstances, 
people cannot be arrested or their houses searched without a warrant issued by 
an independent magistrate because the U.S. Constitution forbids it.149  
Similarly, the “due process clause” of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution asserts that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law,”150 and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment declares, “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”151   
Interpreting these provisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has required that 
the government may only execute someone if that person meets certain 
requirements, has been found guilty of certain offenses after a lawful trial, and 
has been afforded due process; even then, that person may only be executed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Id. (quoting Josef L. Kunz, Editorial Comment, Individual and Collective Self-
Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 872, 876–77 
(1947)). 
148 Id. (quoting Josef L. Kunz, Editorial Comment, Individual and Collective Self-
Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 872, 877 (1947)). 
149 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.  
 
150 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
151 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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certain means.152  Police are not empowered to send a missile into a suspect’s 
home, nor may they knowingly engage in a course of conduct that will result in 
the deaths of innocent civilians.  But U.S. officials have clearly noted that all 
of these protections—even for U.S. citizens—vanish the moment that LOAC 
becomes the applicable legal framework.153  At that point, U.S. citizens may be 
killed or detained without the need for a trial, a criminal conviction, or any of 
the legal process available in ordinary contexts.154   
In addition to those protections afforded by domestic legislation, such 
as the U.S. Constitution, states are required, at the international level, to 
respect those rights protected by international human rights law (IHRL).  
Commentators note that IHRL is a relatively recent development in 
international law which has rapidly developed since the end of World War 
II.155  The goal of IHRL is to grant individuals throughout the world certain 
basic rights,156 and as such, its development represented something of a 
revolution in international law, which historically considered the way in which 
a state treated persons within its territory to be a purely domestic matter.157  As 
sovereigns in the international system, states could expect other states not to 
interfere in their internal affairs.  Human rights law, however, pierced the “veil 
of sovereignty” by seeking directly to regulate how states treated their own 
people within their own borders.158 
A number of international instruments have been enacted to confer on 
individuals certain basic human rights.  Among these are widely accepted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (holding that the death 
penalty, in the instant murder and rape cases before the Supreme Court, would constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
153 See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & 
Counterterrorism, The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy, 
Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Apr. 30, 2012), available 
at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy. 
154 Id.  See also Martinez, supra note 144; Presidential Policy Directive No. PPD-14, 
Procedures Implementing Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2012 (Feb. 28, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-14.pdf 
(outlining the U.S. government’s ability to use the provisions of Sections 1021 and 1022 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012, which grants the U.S. government authority 
to indefinitely detain certain classes of persons engaged in terrorist activities or in support of 
terrorist organizations); JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42143, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY2012: DETAINEE 
MATTERS (2012) (noting that an amendment that would have expressly barred U.S. citizens 
from long-term military detention on account of enemy belligerent status was considered and 
rejected).  For a review of what rights and protections are ordinarily provided to U.S. 
citizens—even suspected terrorists—under U.S. domestic law, see DAN E. STIGALL, 
COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE COMPARATIVE LAW OF INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION (2009). 
155 See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War 
and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580, 590 (2006).  See also STIGALL, supra note 154, at 
9–10. 
156 RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 18 
(James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).  
157 See LOAC DESKBOOK, supra note 131, at 196.  
158 Id.  
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multilateral treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)159 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).160  The ICCPR, to which the United States is a 
party, articulates many of the basic human rights associated with a Western 
democracy: 
 
It guarantees numerous civil and political rights to all 
individuals.  These rights are “essentially those civil and 
political rights reflected in the Western, liberal, democratic 
tradition.”  These “rights are primarily limitations upon the 
power of the State to impose its will upon the people under its 
jurisdiction.”  Specific rights enumerated in the ICCPR 
include:  freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom 
of opinion and expression; freedom of association; the right of 
peaceful assembly; the right to vote; equal protection of the 
law; the right to liberty and security of the person; the right to a 
fair trial, including the presumption of innocence; the right of 
privacy; freedom of movement, residence, and immigration; 
freedom from slavery and forced labor; protection from torture 
or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment; and 
the right to life.161 
 
Human rights also exist in customary international law.  Although there 
is no exhaustive list of which human rights are considered customary 
international law, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law outlines 
an illustrative list, providing:  
 
[A] state violates international law if, as a matter of state 
policy, it practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide; (b) 
slavery or slave trade; (c) the murder or causing the 
disappearance of individuals; (d) torture or other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (e) prolonged 
arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination; or (g) a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights.162   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
160 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
161 Brenda Sue Thornton, The New International Jurisprudence on the Right to Privacy: 
A Head-On Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L. REV. 725, 734–35 (1995) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting various articles of the ICCPR). 
162 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 50, § 702. 
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Although there is ongoing debate regarding the extraterritorial 
application of certain IHRL treaties,163 it is accepted that states are bound to 
respect those rights which are part of customary international law no matter 
where the agents of a state may be operating.164  
Importantly, however, the United States has adopted the view that, like 
the protections of the U.S. Constitution, IHRL does not apply in situations for 
which LOAC is the applicable legal framework.  Otherwise stated, once the 
criteria for the applicability of LOAC are met, LOAC becomes the lex 
specialis, applying “in lieu of, not alongside, IHRL.”165  This has a notable 
impact on the legality of state action under international law and the extent to 
which a state may kill or detain someone and, by creating respective 
limitations and capabilities, forms the approach of state actors to significant 
transnational problems.  Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell highlights the 
distinction in the options presented in the LOAC-IHRL dichotomy: 
 
The law governing when human life may be intentionally 
ended, when the limitation on “arbitrary” deprivation is 
avoided, falls into two categories:  peacetime rules and rules 
within the law of armed conflict.  In peace, a state may only 
take a human life when “absolutely necessary in the defense of 
persons from unlawful violence.”166 
 
The impact of LOAC’s talismanic rights-eclipsing effect is also 
significant as it, in legal terms, creates an essentially Janus-faced world order.  
Humanity may live in geographic zones in which human rights and domestic 
legal protections exist, or else endure life in less fortunate geographic zones 
where legal protections are scant and in which extraordinary levels of violence, 
overwhelming force, and the constant risk of becoming collateral damage 
characterize one’s daily existence. 
C. Triggering the Law of Armed Conflict 
 
Given the U.S. view that neither international human rights nor 
constitutional rights apply when LOAC is applicable, the question of when it 
applies is a salient one.  Any argument for the application of the law of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 See Matthew Waxman, Head of U.S. Delegation, Principal Deputy Dir. of Policy 
Planning, Dep‘t of State, Opening Statement to the U.N. Human Rights Committee (July 17, 
2006), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/70392.htm (speaking on the 
extraterritorial application of the ICCPR). 
164 See LOAC DESKBOOK, supra note 131, at 199 (“If a specific human right falls within 
the category of [customary international law], it should be considered a ‘fundamental’ human 
right.  As such, it is binding on U.S. forces during all overseas operations.”). 
165 Id. at 198 (footnote omitted). 
166 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Adhering to Law and Values Against Terrorism, 2 NOTRE 
DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 289, 296 (2012) (citing McCann & Others v. United Kingdom, 21 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (ser. A) (1995); Montero-Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. 
Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, 69 (July 5, 2006)). 
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international armed conflict to any particular operation presupposes that there 
is an armed conflict.  Accordingly, before applying this body of law to 
extraterritorial operations, the circumstances must be such that an armed 
conflict, as defined by relevant international law, is deemed to be in 
existence.167    
It is commonly accepted that there are two different categories within 
the LOAC framework:  the laws applicable to international armed conflicts and 
the laws applicable to non-international armed conflict.168  The threshold for an 
international (or inter-state) armed conflict is codified in Common Article 2 of 
the Geneva Conventions, which provides, in relevant part, that “the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more . . .  High Contracting Parties . . . .”169  
Non-international (or intra-state) armed conflicts, in turn, are regulated by a 
separate regime of law which is expressed in Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II of 1977.170 
Conflicts that are neither international armed conflicts nor non-
international armed conflicts not regulated by LOAC are, instead, regulated by 
the more restrictive rules governing law enforcement activity and the exercise 
of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction.171  On that score, the threshold for 
the existence of a non-international armed conflict in international law remains 
somewhat indeterminate.172  The Commentary to the Geneva Conventions 
offers non-binding criteria, such as whether the group has an organized 
military force; whether the members of a group are subject to some authority; 
whether the group controls territory; whether the group respects LOAC; and 
whether the government response to the group involves the use of government 
forces.173  Scholars and international tribunals have posited more simplified 
tests for the existence of such a conflict, such as looking to the level of 
violence of the conflict and the level of organization of the non-state actor 
involved.174  Absent these circumstances, there is no trigger for the law of 
international armed conflict and, therefore, no possibility of arguing that it 
applies to a given operation.  As Robin Geiss has remarked:   
 
The nature of a genuine law enforcement operation does not 
change simply because it is conducted in a failed state or in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 See LUBELL, supra note 146, at 164.  Other authors have already given considerable 
attention to this subject.  For an excellent overview of the topic, see Geoffrey S. Corn, What 
Law Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A 
MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 1 (2009). 
168 LUBELL, supra note 146, at 92. 
169 Geneva Convention I, supra note 113, at art. 2. 
170 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 14–15 (1st ed. 2004). 
171 See LUBELL, supra note 146, at 85. 
172 LOAC DESKBOOK, supra note 131, at 26 (discussing the framework of LOAC). 
173 Id. (citing Geneva Convention I, supra note 113, Commentary). 
174 See LUBELL, supra note 146, at 129. 
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territory where an armed conflict is in progress.  In other 
words, the mere existence of an already high level of violence 
does not automatically transform each and every law 
enforcement operation into an involvement in a non-
international armed conflict governed by [LOAC].175   
 
As noted, if a law enforcement operation does not meet these criteria or 
occur within a context that would allow for the applicability of LOAC, then the 
applicable framework would be the ordinary legal regime regulating 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, the relevant provisions of 
international human rights law, and the absence of any lex specialis to offer 
state actors greater latitude. 
 
 
D. The Geographic Expanse of the Law of International Armed 
Conflict 
 
Inherent in the idea of jus ad bellum is the idea that it is lawful for one 
state to use force against another state in the territory of that state.  Otherwise 
stated, LOAC presupposes extraterritoriality.  If the circumstances exist for the 
lawful use of force under jus ad bellum, then so long as a state abides by the 
rules articulated in jus in bello, that state’s extraterritorial actions are 
considered lawful.176  This only becomes problematic in the context of cross-
border strikes against non-state actors, which require military action in the 
territory of a third country that is not a party to the conflict.  In such 
circumstances, some scholars have opined that the use of force against non-
state actors who are launching attacks from within the territory of a third 
country is permissible when that third country is unwilling or unable to take 
measures to stop those attacks.177  It should be noted, however, that such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Geiss, supra note 24, at 141. 
176 See supra text accompanying note 131 (defining jus ad bellum and jus in bello). 
177 See DINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 244–46.  See also Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or 
Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 
483 (2012).  But see O’Connell, supra note 166, at 301 (footnotes omitted) (asserting that 
international law contains no rule justifying the use of force with respect to a state unable or 
unwilling to use force to control terrorist activity on its territory): 
 
In this author’s research, the phrase “unable or unwilling” appears to have 
surfaced in connection with justifying resort to military force against foreign 
sovereign states in the document titled “The Chatham House Principles of 
International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence.”  The document was 
sponsored by the foreign affairs think tank Chatham House (the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs).  The reference to resort to force against 
states “unable or unwilling” to control terrorism on their territory has no 
citation to authority in international law.  Apparently the Principles include 
the “unable and unwilling” basis because the drafters of the Principles 
understood this to be a basis for resort to force that states want, rather than a 
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view is not universal, and textual authority for such cross-border attacks is 
limited.178  Nonetheless, even taking into account the indeterminacy of its 
exact geographic limits, it is clear that LOAC allows militaries to engage in a 
vast amount of extraterritorial activity.      
 
E. Civilians and the Law of International Armed Conflict 
 
As a general rule, the LOAC framework serves to prohibit the 
intentional targeting of civilians and to minimize the role that civilians can 
play in an armed conflict.179  Even so, civilian law enforcement personnel are 
now operating abroad, including in conflict zones such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan.180  In those environments, civilian law enforcement agencies 
work in cooperation with military and intelligence counterparts,181  and at least 
on the surface, there is some symmetry between the work of law enforcement 
agents and military operations.  In such an environment, the work of civilians 
and their military counterparts may be overlapping in substance and function.  
In some cases, the work of the military may even seem identical to that 
performed by civilians.  For instance, one commentator has noted that “[i]n the 
conduct of armed conflict, a State may not only kill or wound combatants 
fighting on behalf of its enemies, but it may also take them prisoner and hold 
them until the end of the conflict.”182   Thus, military operations may closely 
resemble ordinary law enforcement operations in that they involve 
apprehension and investigation rather than lethal targeting.183   
Given those similarities and the more permissible rules that govern 
armed conflict, it may seem tempting to find room under that rubric for 
extraterritorial law enforcement operations by civilian agencies.  After all, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
basis that currently exists in international law.  It is, therefore, a proposal for 
a future rule but one that contradicts the UN Charter.  
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“[t]hese rules allow for a higher level of force and a looser finger on the trigger 
than if IHL were not applicable.”184  An analysis of LOAC demonstrates, 
however, that a similarity in objectives does not equate to parity under 
international law, and civilian law enforcement operations are granted no 
special privileges by the law of war. 
 
F. What Civilians May Not Do—and What Combatants May Not 
Do to Them   
 
Even if the preliminary threshold is met and LOAC applies, there are 
still fundamental reasons why its application to extraterritorial law 
enforcement operations by civilian agencies is implausible.  This is because 
LOAC, though allowing greater latitude in certain respects, is still a highly 
regulated legal framework that limits the use of force by strictly defining the 
parties authorized to use force and the parties against whom it may be used.185     
Under the law of international armed conflict, persons are classified as 
combatants, noncombatants, or civilians.186  Combatants are those who meet 
the criteria of that category under the Geneva Conventions, including being 
part of the armed forces of a party to a conflict or part of a militia that is an 
organized force subject to a command structure; having a fixed distinctive sign 
that is recognizable at a distance; carrying arms openly; and conducting 
operations in accordance with the laws of war.187  Noncombatants are those 
personnel, such as medical personnel and chaplains, who are allowed on the 
battlefield but may not engage in active combat without losing their protected 
status.188  All other persons are classified as civilians.189  
Article 51(3) of the 1977 Protocol Additional I to the Geneva 
Conventions (“Protocol I”), states that civilians enjoy immunity from attack 
during international armed conflict “unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities.”190  Such language reflects the general rule that 
combatants are allowed to attack other combatants and military targets but are 
prohibited from targeting civilians.191  The loss of such protections is a 
significant event because civilians who lose such protections can be targeted 
(i.e., killed) are not entitled to POW (prisoner of war) status upon capture and 
“may be tried by an opposing force’s judicial system for actions taken while 
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directly participating in hostilities.”192  This is because the use of force under 
the law of international armed conflict is the special privilege of the 
combatant—and something forbidden to civilians.  Civilians, therefore, are to 
be neither the targets nor the wielders of military force under the law of 
international armed conflict.  Dinstein notes, “The goal is to ensure in every 
feasible manner that international armed conflicts [are] waged solely among 
the combatants of the belligerent Parties.”193  
It is important to emphasize that the law of international armed conflict 
makes the participation of civilians in hostilities an illegal act, which not only 
deprives civilians of the protections that they are normally due but also 
subjects them to criminal sanctions for their acts of belligerency.194  On that 
score, U.S. civilian law enforcement will typically not meet the criteria of a 
lawful combatant in that they are not part of the U.S. Armed Forces and are 
thus not part of the regular forces of a belligerent state.195  Similarly, U.S. 
civilian law enforcement agencies are not part of a militia or volunteer corps.  
Their purpose is to investigate crime rather than to fight wars.196  Their 
participation in the hostilities would, therefore, be deemed an illegal act.  
Civilian law enforcement agents, therefore, cannot lawfully avail themselves of 
the more permissible rules available to combatants under the law of 
international armed conflict.  
Moreover, many (and perhaps most) of the subjects of law enforcement 
operations—even those conducted in zones of persistent conflict—will be 
civilians.197  While there will doubtlessly be those situations in which a 
particular subject might be suspected of activities that deprive him  of 
protected status, there remains a vast and varied universe of criminality (e.g., 
economic crimes) that could not be realistically linked to direct participation in 
hostilities.  Not only would the U.S. law enforcement agent be considered a 
civilian who is not permitted to wield force under the law of international 
armed conflict but the suspect would be considered a civilian who is protected 
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from such uses of force.  “The legality of an operation designed for intentional 
use of force directed at individuals can hinge on the determination of their 
status and if the person is a protected civilian then intentional force against 
them will fail this initial stage of lawful validation.”198 
In short, the law of international armed conflict is a poor fit for most 
extraterritorial law enforcement operations by civilian agencies.  Nothing in its 
mechanics or undergirding philosophy would easily lend to its application in 
such a manner.  This is true even though the law enforcement agent may be 
working in an extremely dangerous environment.  Although certain 
extraterritorial operations may be justified on such grounds, given the right set 
of circumstances,199 for the vast majority of law enforcement operations—
conducted by civilian agents against civilian suspects—LOAC will simply not 
provide the operative legal framework. 
IV. THE EDGE OF THE LOAC-LAW ENFORCEMENT PRECIPICE 
 
Given the wide-ranging activities of military forces, it is unsurprising 
that military activity sometimes transcends thematic classification.  On 
occasion, military personnel perform civilian-like roles in the context of an 
armed conflict.  Similarly, military personnel may perform law enforcement 
tasks outside of the context of armed conflict.  Contemporary military 
activities, accordingly, may occur at the fine edge of the lines, which 
distinguish LOAC-based activities from law enforcement activity.  
Nonetheless, although these activities may often seem to mirror one another, 
the legal basis for each sort of activity remains distinct.   
 
A. Military Law Enforcement in Non-combat Contexts 
 
Separate from the question of what abilities are permissible to military 
forces operating pursuant to LOAC is the question of what extraterritorial 
investigative and law enforcement capabilities are permissible outside the 
conflict zone and during times of relative peace.  When not acting pursuant to 
LOAC, military investigators abroad operate under the same basic constraints 
as their civilian counterparts.200 
 
The potential for extraterritorial law enforcement by the 
military highlights two fundamental tensions.  First, any action 
taken abroad must be reconciled with the general presumption 
that nations retain sovereignty within their own territory.  
Without the approval of foreign nations, American agents who 
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operate abroad risk offending comity between nations as well 
as the international legal system.  In some cases, they may 
expose themselves to criminal liability within other 
countries.201 
 
The U.S. Armed Forces have an array of investigative services that are 
charged with the investigation of crime (both military and civilian) as a routine 
part of the regulation of military society wherever military installations are 
found.  The major military investigative entities are the Air Force Office of 
Special Investigations (AFOSI), the Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
(NCIS), the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), and the Defense 
Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).202  These entities are charged with 
investigating civilian misconduct as well as crimes committed by members of 
the military,203 and due to the international presence of the U.S. military on 
installations across the globe, the investigative purview of these entities is not 
limited to the territorial United States but rather extends to military 
installations abroad.   
Due to the seemingly broad license of military personnel to investigate 
and even prosecute abroad,204 there may, at a superficial level, appear to be 
parity among armed forces using military force abroad, those conducting 
stability operations, and the ability of military investigators to operate 
extraterritorially.  After all, on a daily basis, military investigators abroad 
conduct investigations in foreign territories such as Germany, Italy, and Korea 
and, should they produce sufficient evidence, military courts-martial frequently 
prosecute U.S. service members in courthouses that rest on what is technically 
foreign soil.205  
Though it may seem as though the military actors in each circumstance 
are merely operating in accord with the same permissive grant of power, the 
regulation of the standard extraterritorial activity of the military’s criminal 
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justice apparatus is actually quite limited.  It exists not pursuant to the tenets of 
LOAC but as a function of specific international agreements designed to 
provide a framework to govern the status of U.S. military personnel abroad.  
These agreements are known as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).206   
 
A SOFA is an agreement that establishes the framework under 
which armed forces operate within a foreign country.  The 
agreement provides for rights and privileges of covered 
individuals while in the foreign jurisdiction, addressing how 
the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied to 
U.S. personnel while in that country.  It is important to note 
that a SOFA is a contract between parties and may be cancelled 
at the will of either party.  SOFAs are peacetime documents 
and therefore do not address the rules of war, the Laws of 
Armed Conflict, or the Laws of the Sea.  In the event of armed 
conflict between parties to a SOFA, the terms of the agreement 
would no longer be applicable.207 
 
SOFAs are wide-ranging agreements that regulate a broad spectrum of 
activity, from relevant rights and privileges of service members in the foreign 
jurisdiction and questions of jurisdiction to claims mechanisms for damage 
done by visiting forces.208  Although the United States is party to more than 
100 such agreements, the most prominent SOFA is the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) SOFA,209 which governs the treatment of U.S. forces 
present in NATO countries.210 
Under the NATO SOFA, extraterritorial investigative activity by 
military entities is largely covered by Paragraph 10 of SOFA Article VII.211  
Paragraph 10(a) provides that “[r]egularly constituted military units or 
formations of a force shall have the right to police any camps, establishment or 
other premises which they occupy as the result of an agreement with the 
receiving State.”212  This provision gives U.S. forces present in a foreign 
country the ability to conduct certain law enforcement operations that occur on 
specific installations occupied “as the result of an agreement with the receiving 
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State.”213  Paragraph 10(b) of that same article provides a circumscribed ability 
to conduct law enforcement operations outside such installations: 
 
Outside these premises, such military police shall be employed 
only subject to arrangements with the authorities of the 
receiving State and in liaison with those authorities, and in so 
far as such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and 
order among the members of the force.214 
 
Thus, when operating outside the premises agreed upon by the host 
nation and the visiting forces, military law enforcement can operate only with 
the agreement of the host nation, only in coordination with their law 
enforcement officials, and only when such operations are necessary for 
regulation of order and discipline of the visiting forces.215  The U.S-Iraq 
Security Agreement216 contains similar language.  Article 22(1) of that 
agreement states that “[n]o detention or arrest may be carried out by the United 
States Forces (except with respect to detention or arrest of members of the 
United States Forces and of the civilian component) except through an Iraqi 
decision issued in accordance with Iraqi law . . . .”217  Likewise, “[t]he United 
States Forces may not search houses or other real estate properties except by 
order of an Iraqi judicial warrant and in full coordination with the Government 
of Iraq, except in the case of [combat operations].”218 
It is worth highlighting the similarity between SOFAs and the treaties 
that created the capitulatory regime.  SOFAs grant an exception to the general 
rules of sovereignty and non-interference by permitting a foreign sovereign to 
exercise extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction within the territory of a host 
nation.  As such, the international legal order continues to permit, in certain 
circumstances, a degree of pluralism in which one sovereign exercises 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction within the territory of another.  The 
practice notable during the capitulatory regime endures through the force of 
such agreements. 
Without these agreements, however, U.S. military investigators would 
find themselves confronted with the same limitations as their civilian 
counterparts when it comes to conducting law enforcement activity abroad.  
Accordingly, although U.S. military investigators enjoy more expansive 
geographic investigative capabilities, those increased capabilities are treaty-
based—their capabilities are both enhanced and delimited by the agreements 
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that define their status and capabilities.  As such, with regard to extraterritorial 
law enforcement activity in ungoverned spaces to which the relevant treaties 
do not apply, military investigators and civilian law enforcement agents 
encounter the same legal prohibitions. 
B. “Conviction-Focused Targeting” and Law Enforcement 
During Combat and Stability Operations 
 
One of the most fascinating and dramatic developments implicating 
international law and enforcement jurisdiction is the increasingly common 
practice of state-building and the conduct of “stability operations” by military 
forces:  military missions, tasks, or activities conducted in foreign countries 
and in coordination with other instruments of national power “to maintain or 
reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government 
services . . . .”219  This practice presents a limited exercise of extraterritorial 
enforcement jurisdiction in that foreign actors will be conducting law 
enforcement activity, albeit in support of the domestic legal institutions.  In 
this sort of activity, the foreign sovereign intrudes upon the core function of 
the host nation—but in support of the host nation and not in support of the 
foreign nation’s own laws. 
Articulating the doctrinal basis for this practice, the U.S. Army Field 
Manual on Stability Operations notes that military forces may be called upon 
to “provide a broad range of activities to protect the civilian populace,” 
including “interim policing and crowd control” and “perform[ing] civilian 
police functions, including investigating crimes and making arrests.”220  
 
Integral to establishing civil control is the support military 
forces provide to law enforcement and policing operations.  
Host-nation civilian law enforcement agencies and 
organizations may provide this capability if the security 
environment permits.  However, in a fragile state, these 
institutions may have become corrupt or failed altogether.  In 
failed states, especially during and immediately after conflict, 
military police forces are the only organizations able to fill this 
void.221 
 
This practice has given rise to the use of the military in certain law 
enforcement actions abroad.  Professor Robert Chesney has described the 
reality of this unorthodox military role in Iraq, noting that “[d]riven by 
strategic necessity, the military in Iraq has embraced its law enforcement 
support function to a remarkable extent in recent years” and that the U.S. 
military “is more capable of and interested in facilitating prosecutorial 
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outcomes today than it was in years past—much more so than is commonly 
appreciated—notwithstanding the fact that this transformation is taking place 
in an overseas, quasi-battlefield context.”222 
Similarly, Major Steve Berlin, a U.S. Army Judge Advocate (JAG), has 
expounded upon the practice of—and continued need for—what he terms 
“conviction-focused targeting” by U.S. military forces conducting stability 
operations.223  Major Berlin posits that, as U.S. forces shift to stability 
operations, military commanders must shift their targeting philosophy to 
combat violent extremist networks by simultaneously harnessing and nurturing 
the capabilities of host nation criminal justice institutions:  “The host nation 
systems in turn become stronger; thus, [U.S. forces] will target [violent 
extremist networks] while simultaneously strengthening the host nation 
. . . .”224   
Such non-lethal targeting became even more important to U.S. 
operations in the context of Iraq as U.S. military operations shifted from a law 
of armed conflict paradigm to a law enforcement paradigm.225  With the entry 
into force of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, the U.S. military presence and 
the conduct of operations became based on the consent of the Iraqi government 
rather than the law of armed conflict or the legal regime of belligerent 
occupation.226  Such a paradigm shift meant that U.S. forces were required to 
transition from conducting operations under the rather expansive grants of 
authority provided by the law of armed conflict to operating under the far more 
strict authorities of a law enforcement paradigm.227  This transition meant that 
the foreign criminal justice system became a central focus of U.S. military 
operations and that those operations, now dependent on host nation consent, 
took on a more police-like character.  Highlighting the extensive role that the 
U.S. military has played in Iraqi criminal justice since the operational 
transition that occurred upon implementation of the U.S.-Iraq Security 
Agreement, Professor Chesney notes: 
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Iraq.  During this period, however, MNF-I’s operations also began to shift from a purely war 
paradigm to a law-enforcement paradigm, which fostered cooperation with the government of 
Iraq and paved the way for Iraqi assumption of security responsibility.  Detention operations, 
in particular, incorporated law-enforcement elements within the purview of the Iraqi 
government alongside the security detentions authorized under Resolution 1546.”). 
226 Id. at 91 (“Since the expiration of the UN mandate for the MNF-I and the entry into 
force of the Security Agreement on January 1, 2009, the legal basis for the US military 
presence and operations in Iraq has been the consent of the Iraqi government.”). 
227 Id. at 92 (footnote omitted) (“Consistent with this approach, the agreement requires 
that all such military operations are subject to the agreement of the government of Iraq and 
must be coordinated with Iraqi authorities.”). 
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What did this transition entail in actual practice?  Simply put, it 
meant that, from 2009 onward, the U.S. military would 
function in significant part as a criminal investigation, arrest, 
and trial support service in Iraq.  In that capacity, it assisted 
with the arrest and prosecution of at least 1393 individuals 
between January 2009 and July 15, 2010 (mostly described as 
members or associates of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, according to press 
releases issued by U.S. Forces-Iraq), while simultaneously 
screening more than 15,000 legacy detainees for either outright 
release or transfer into the Iraqi criminal justice system.228 
 
It is too soon to tell the extent to which Iraq will serve as a model for 
future stability operations—especially given that the approach to each such 
endeavor will necessarily depend on the specific context of the country at 
issue.  What is certain, however, is that such operations straddle the line 
between traditional military operations and civilian law enforcement activity, 
involving aspects of both and even employing civilian law enforcement 
agencies in furtherance of their objective.229  The legal bases for action in such 
operations can be complex and confusing230 because military forces may, 
depending on circumstances, seek to operate under the aegis of military 
authority operating pursuant to the law of armed conflict or, alternatively, on 
behalf of the host nation and pursuant to the law of the host nation (as was the 
case in Iraq after 2009).231  In such circumstances, it may sometimes seem as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Chesney, supra note 222, at 601 (footnote omitted). 
229 See Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability 
Operations, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T DEF., 
http://policy.defense.gov/solic/psso/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (“Integrated military 
and civilian operations are the now [sic] the norm with most military operations taking place in 
the midst of civilian populations.”). 
230 Dale Stephens, Military Involvement in Law Enforcement, 92 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
453, 453 (2010).  Captain Stephens notes:  
 
The conduct of contemporary military operations takes place in a highly 
complex and contested terrain of legal and social norms.  Whether a military 
force is engaged in conventional armed conflict, counter-insurgency, anti-
terrorism, peacekeeping/enforcement, stability operations, or law 
enforcement, there is a convergence of a dense mixture of law, doctrine and 
policy that guides military decision-making.  Within this highly pluralist 
environment, the synchronization of law and policy on the one hand, and of 
formalism and social effect on the other, needs to be constantly reconciled. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
231 See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 130, at 163.  According to the 
handbook:  
 
After January 1, 2009, U.S. forces are supporting the Government of Iraq 
and are conducting operations in accordance with a security agreement.  
Under the security agreement, “no detention or arrest may be carried out by 
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though the international law vis-à-vis extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction 
becomes more malleable or blurred.  But this is merely an illusion caused by 
the incrementally shifting authorities under which military forces operate in 
such circumstances.  Once the ability to operate under the law of armed 
conflict ceases, the law enforcement paradigm prevails and the prohibition on 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction applies. 
V. THE DISPARITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROBLEM OF 
UNGOVERNED SPACES 
 
As the discussion above demonstrates, civilian law enforcement agents 
operate in a far more regulated legal universe than military entities.  In the 
course of their activities, civilian law enforcement entities must abide by 
domestic and international laws that grant individuals certain basic rights and, 
with regard to extraterritorial activity, must refrain from most unilateral actions 
because “[n]o state may exercise its enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of 
another State without that State’s permission.”232  Military entities, in contrast, 
may use lethal and destructive force with far fewer limitations and operate in 
the context of a legal regime that assumes that they will be operating 
extraterritorially.  Moreover, the legal framework in which the military 
operates is one in which even the most basic human rights can be disregarded 
so long as the resultant death or deprivation is considered necessary and 
proportional and was occasioned in the pursuit of a legitimate military 
objective.233   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the United States Forces (except with respect to detention or arrest of 
members of the United States forces and of the civilian component) except 
through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with Iraqi Law and pursuant 
to Article 4.”  Article 4 allows U.S. forces to conduct military operations that 
are coordinated with Iraqi authorities and conducted in accordance with Iraqi 
law.  “In the event the United States Forces detain or arrest persons as 
authorized by . . . [the] agreement or Iraqi law, such persons must be handed 
over to competent Iraqi authorities within twenty-four hours from the time of 
their detention or arrest.”  Therefore, the detention regime in Iraq has 
changed from one based on international law, where detention was necessary 
for imperative reasons of security, to a law enforcement detention regime 
grounded in Iraq’s domestic criminal law. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
232 LOWE, supra note 47, at 184. 
233 Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 HARV. 
NAT’L SEC. J. 145, 154 (2010) (“In a traditional war context, killing fourteen civilians along 
with the highest military commander of the enemy could be considered proportionate collateral 
damage.  For comparison’s sake, the special report of the prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the NATO operation in Kosovo determined 
that ten (and according to some reports, seventeen) civilian casualties were legitimate 
collateral damage for the attack on the Serbian television station.”). 
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A. An Exception to Remedy the Incongruity in International Law 
 
The disparate nature of the two regimes is dramatic and somewhat 
counterintuitive, leading to legal results that can seem incongruous.  Once 
there is a basis for the use of force under jus ad bellum, the range of 
permissible activity under jus in bello is extensive.  For instance, once the 
prerequisites for the use of force are met under international law, an individual 
in a foreign country who is considered a legitimate target under LOAC can be 
lethally targeted by a missile fired from a predator drone.  This is true even 
if—somewhat more arguably—that person is located in the territory of a third 
state that is not a party to the conflict.234  If, however, LOAC were not 
applicable, it would be a violation of international law for civilian law 
enforcement agents to enter foreign territory uninvited, merely in order to 
investigate the person’s activities, and an even more egregious violation to 
arrest the suspect—even if that arrest were effected so that the criminal could 
be flown to the United States to face trial where he or she would be afforded 
the full panoply of rights granted by the U.S. Constitution.235  No special 
triggering mechanism exists to permit civilian law enforcement to take 
unilateral action in the territory of a foreign sovereign for the purposes of 
addressing transnational crime.  International law is most forgiving to the form 
of extraterritorial conduct that is most destructive and least protective of rights 
and, conversely, most restrictive on the form of extraterritorial conduct that is 
least destructive and most protective of rights.   
Given this mind-wrenching decision of all or nothing, it is evident why 
governments seek to argue for LOAC to be applicable in an increasingly broad 
range of circumstances and eschew law enforcement approaches in favor of 
military solutions.  As Robert Mandel, Professor of International Affairs at 
Lewis & Clark College, poignantly notes: 
 
Traditional distinctions are now blurring between military and 
police activities, between defense and law enforcement 
functions, and between internal and external security.  Facets 
of the murky military/police divide include the recently 
emerging pattern of military forces becoming more involved in 
domestic security missions such as border patrol; policing 
functions becoming more internationalized and militarized; the 
police and the criminal justice system relying more heavily on 
the military/war model for their rationale and policy dealing 
with crime, drugs, and terrorism; and criminality often being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 See DINSTEIN, supra note 18 at 244–46.  See also Deeks, supra note 177.  But see 
O’Connell, supra note 166, at 301. 
235 Blum & Heymann, supra note 233, at 161 (2010) (“As a general principle of 
international law, a country is strictly prohibited from engaging in law enforcement operations 
in the territory of another country, and much more so when the law enforcement operation 
includes killing a person.”). 
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redefined as insurgency and crime control often being 
redefined as low-intensity conflict.236 
 
The recontextualization of transnational crime as a military matter is 
the engine that drives the “over-militarization” that worries senior military 
leaders.  But given the increasing level of transnational criminality and the 
enduring problem of ungoverned spaces, how can states more efficiently 
respond using civilian law enforcement without recontextualizing a 
transnational crime as a military matter?  A fair solution to the conundrum 
would be for international law to recognize a degree of laxity in the general 
limits on the extraterritorial exercise of enforcement jurisdiction by civilian 
law enforcement authorities vis-à-vis ungoverned spaces.  An exception of this 
sort to the general prohibition would permit states to more readily employ 
civilian, rather than military, resources when dealing with transnational crime.  
The result would be a paradigm shift both in the international law of 
jurisdiction and in the way that governments approach transnational crime—
but it is a result that would ultimately be of benefit to international law, to 
those countries to which the ungoverned spaces belong, and even to the 
transnational criminals who would be ferreted out. 
The counterargument for such a proposal is that an increase in the 
permissible range of activity that one state may carry out within the territory of 
another would increase the likelihood of international conflict.237  But by virtue 
of their activity, transnational criminals are already in the process of creating 
those conflicts, and there is an equally strong argument that allowing such 
activity to continue unabated is likely to be even more conflict-generative.  By 
creating a legal regime to regulate such extraterritorial activities by civilian law 
enforcement, policymakers could somewhat ameliorate the propensity for 
conflict that extraterritorial law enforcement activity would occasion.   
In that regard, in must be noted that some scholars have already argued, 
in the context of counterterrorism, that international law should “[permit] 
minor territorial breaches for the greater good of global security . . . .”238  This 
theory of permissible intrusion, taking its name from contract theory, is 
commonly referred to as “efficient breach.”239  Notably, Andrew Calica has 
proposed a seven-part test to justify an extraterritorial abduction in cases 
involving terrorists abroad.240  Under this proposed model, extraterritorial 
abduction would be permissible in situations where (1) the terrorist threat is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 MANDEL, supra note 13, at 19 (footnotes omitted). 
237 See LUBELL, supra note 146, at 79 (footnote omitted) (“The prospect of opening the 
door to allow states the relative freedom of defining what is a threat that justifies sending 
forces to operate in the territory of another state, is one that does not bode well for 
international order.”). 
238 Gregory S. McNeal & Brian J. Field, Snatch-and-Grab Ops: Justifying 
Extraterritorial Abduction, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 491, 519 (2007). 
239 Andrew J. Calica, Note, Self-Help Is the Best Kind: The Efficient Breach Justification 
for Forcible Abduction of Terrorists, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 389, 393 n.13 (2004). 
240 Id. at 394 (footnote omitted). 
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imminent, (2) the opportunity for abduction is fleeting, (3) the target nation is 
unwilling to extradite or prosecute, (4) the international community is 
gridlocked, (5) the territorial infringement is reasonably limited, (6) the 
operation involves minimal threat to bystanders, and (7) the accused receives 
humane treatment and a fair trial.241  
Permitting the arrest and transfer of fugitives from within the territory 
of another sovereign under an “efficient breach” theory has been promoted as 
benefitting the international community because it “remov[es] a serious threat 
from international travel and action.”242  But the need for extraterritorial law 
enforcement activity extends beyond the sole act of arrest (or “abduction”) and 
for cases aside from those linked to terrorism.  What is needed in international 
law, therefore, is not merely a narrow exception for abductions in 
counterterrorism matters but a more comprehensive exception to the general 
prohibition on the exercise of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction in 
ungoverned spaces—an exception that allows for a broader range of law 
enforcement activity to counteract transnational crime of every variety.   
Lubell has obliquely suggested a potential approach “to develop the 
extraterritorial law enforcement concept into a wider notion, allowing for 
lower scales of force,” which would not violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter.243  Lubell ultimately rejects such an approach because Article 2(4) is 
meant to prohibit all force and because “whilst international law does sanction, 
and even demand, state action against certain individuals or groups, it does so 
in a way that does not endorse extraterritorial force used in another state 
without consent.”244  But Lubell’s conclusion serves only to highlight the 
problem.  If the current international legal framework does not permit 
extraterritorial activity except for very limited exceptions that entail military 
responses, then it is only natural that states will make increasing use of those 
military-centric exceptions as transnational crime becomes more prevalent and 
ungoverned spaces increasingly serve as a base for transnational criminal 
activity. 
 As a solution to this incongruence—an incongruence that only serves 
to increasingly militarize state approaches to transnational criminality—it is 
proposed that states should recognize a limited exception in international law 
for extraterritorial law enforcement operations that occur in territories where 
there is no government capable or willing to counter a specific transnational 
criminal element.  In cases involving transnational criminals who are operating 
or are present in ungoverned spaces, international law should allow for an 
exception to the general prohibition against extraterritorial enforcement 
jurisdiction by civilian actors.     
At the outset, from a historical perspective, it is worth noting that the 
exception to the rule against extraterritorial law enforcement advocated in this 
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242 McNeal & Field, supra note 238, at 520 (footnote omitted). 
243 LUBELL, supra note 146, at 77. 
244 Id. at 78. 
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Article is not without some precedent.  As the discussion above demonstrates, 
history is replete with examples of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, 
albeit much of it based on treaties such as capitulations and SOFAs.245  In 
addition, the special challenges posed by piracy, and the ungoverned spaces 
from which they operate, have given rise to an exceptional and limited 
authorization for states to exercise extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction in 
places such as Somalia.246  Moreover, even in the absence of such U.N. 
authority, contemporary literature is replete with examples of states conducting 
such operations extraterritorially, though in apparent violation of international 
law as it currently stands.247   
In addition, a certain number of scholars now contend that the modern 
LOAC framework provides an analogous exception with regard to military 
engagements with non-state actors in the territories of third countries.  Under 
such circumstances, these scholars theorize that it is permissible to use military 
force in the territory of a third country against non-state actors who are 
launching attacks from within the territory of that country when that third 
country is unwilling or unable to take measures to stop those attacks.248  If such 
a rule is accepted, reasoning a fortiori (a maiore ad minus), international law 
should also permit less invasive activity on foreign soil against non-state actors 
by civilian law enforcement personnel.  Even if such a broad rule for cross-
border attacks under LOC is rejected, however, such a rule may be considered 
operable in the context of law enforcement operations in ungoverned spaces.  
In that regard, it must be noted that a sound argument exists in international 
law that, in cases where intransigent governments have refused to take action 
against a transnational criminal whose activities create cross-border effects, 
thereby violating the rule of aut dedere aut judicare, some limited law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 See, e.g., Bentwich, supra note 54, at 89 (noting the voluntary grant by Ottoman 
sultans to Europeans in Ottoman territory to remain subject to the jurisdiction of their country 
and immune from Ottoman jurisdiction). 
246 See Geiss, supra note 24, at 139.  Discussing law enforcement operations by third 
parties, Robin Geiss notes:  
 
Resolution 1851 of 16 December 2008, like previous resolutions on the 
subject, explicitly recognizes ‘the lack of capacity of the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) to interdict, or upon interdiction to prosecute pirates or 
to patrol and secure the waters off the coast of Somalia . . . [.]’  It is against 
this background that the Security Council, by virtue especially of 
Resolutions 1816, 1846 and 1851, has defined and extended the legal basis 
for the exercise of enforcement and adjudicative jurisdiction by third parties 
with regard to the repression of piracy in the area. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
247 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 90 I.L.R. 691, 694 (S. Ct. 1990) (U.S.) (noting 
extraterritorial operations to obtain custody of fugitives carried out by Canadian, Israeli, 
German, and U.S. law enforcement authorities). 
248 See DINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 244–46; Deeks, supra note 177.  
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enforcement action might be permissible as a countermeasure.249  Under such 
an approach, law enforcement activity, such as surveillance, other forms of 
investigation, and ultimately even arrest, could be viewed as a permissible 
countermeasure because it is action in response to a violation of international 
law, so long as the extraterritorial law enforcement activity was truly necessary 
to avoid significant harm, was therefore a proportional response,250 and did not 
rise to the level of an “armed attack,” thus triggering the right to self-defense 
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.251 
Moreover, from a policy perspective, permitting an exception to the 
rule against extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction in ungoverned spaces 
would serve a number of purposes.  From a rights-based perspective, 
permitting extraterritorial law enforcement activity under such circumstances 
would increase the probability and frequency of cases in which transnational 
criminals are made to face justice in a forum that provides the protections 
available under domestic law and international human rights law (rather than 
lethally targeted in a military operation).  This is because, as detailed above, 
civilian law enforcement officials typically must operate pursuant to the 
constraints of domestic law and international human rights law.  As such, 
enhancing the ability of civilian law enforcement to conduct activities 
extraterritorially would serve to increase the number of cases potentially 
addressed under these legal frameworks.  Policymakers would then also be free 
to dedicate resources to civilian agencies so that capabilities for unilateral 
extraterritorial operations could be enhanced and developed. 
Conversely, permitting extraterritorial law enforcement activity in 
ungoverned spaces would likely decrease the overall number of cases 
addressed through military action because military action would no longer be 
the exclusive lawful approach under international law.  Instead, a viable 
civilian approach would exist under international law, permitting civilian law 
enforcement authorities to take unilateral extraterritorial law enforcement 
action in a limited set of circumstances.  Importantly, such action would have 
to occur under a legal framework that, as a general rule, does not permit lethal 
targeting and, instead, mandates that a certain level of due process be afforded 
the transnational criminal before a punishment could be implemented.  As 
such, transnational criminals would be less frequently the subject of a military 
response and more frequently the subject of judicial proceedings at which they 
would be afforded a fair trial.  As a result, though the principle of 
nonintervention would be caveated, domestic legal protections and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 See MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 229 (2008) (“States and 
international organizations may use countermeasures in response to violations of international 
legal obligations.”). 
250 See generally Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in 
International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715 (2008) (discussing the proportionality principle in 
relation to military matters). 
251 Id. at 719–20.  See also U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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international human rights law would be made applicable to a host of matters 
that would otherwise be governed solely by the lex specialis of LOAC.   
In addition, it may also be fairly argued that the creation of such an 
exception would bring international law more in line with the contemporary 
practice of states.  It is worth noting that contemporary literature is replete with 
examples of states conducting such operations extraterritorially in potential 
violation of international law.252  Recognizing a limited range of cases in 
which extraterritorial law enforcement activity is permissible would, in many 
regards, merely align international law with the reality of contemporary state 
practice.   
Permitting extraterritorial law enforcement action in ungoverned spaces 
would also serve to help rebalance civilian and military roles with regard to 
transnational crime.  As noted, this trend of militarization has been viewed 
with a jaundiced eye by both rights advocates and those in the military 
establishment who see the trend as a distraction from the core mission of the 
armed forces: 
 
The real threat posed by increasing military participation in law 
enforcement is that use of the military in law enforcement 
operations will dull the critical war-fighting skills the military 
services need.  Fundamentally, the nation must think and 
choose wisely, using the military in law enforcement 
judiciously, when its capabilities can be of most use, of greatest 
success, and complementary to the skills the military needs to 
be effective in a modern combat environment.253 
 
Creating a zone of permissible extraterritorial law enforcement action 
in international law would serve to relieve the burden of the military by 
making civilian law enforcement responses to transnational crime more tenable 
and fundamentally altering the equation for those cases in which a military 
response—and the recontextualizing of a matter as a military threat—is the 
only available option under international law. 
Lastly, extraterritorial law enforcement operations in ungoverned 
spaces might also be considered less objectionable because the sovereignty in 
question, the sovereignty being violated, is that of a government unable to 
effectively control its own territory.  In that regard, the extraterritorial law 
enforcement action being undertaken could even be perceived as a positive 
development; though such an exception would likely mean that ungoverned 
spaces would likely be more prone to foreign authorities acting on their soil, 
those ungoverned areas would be less prone to use by transnational criminals 
as bases for operations and places of hiding.  This acceptance of foreign law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 90 I.L.R. at 694 (noting extraterritorial operations to obtain 
custody of fugitives carried out by Canadian, Israeli, German, and U.S. law enforcement 
authorities). 
253 Cunningham, supra note 9, at 702. 
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enforcement would be at the cost of some degree of sovereignty but would 
allow countries with a lack of control over their territories to obtain, even if 
episodically, a form of authority operating within their territory to counter-
criminal elements.  Importantly, the invasive action would be in furtherance of 
law enforcement action that would be, in various stages, governed by domestic 
legal protections and international human rights law, resulting in a legal 
process in which the suspect would be afforded rights and a degree of due 
process—rather than simply being destroyed by a missile.  Permitting the 
exception to the prohibition against extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction in 




The phenomenon of transnational criminal activity occurring in 
ungoverned spaces is a mounting challenge for governments seeking to protect 
their citizens—a challenge exacerbated as technology creates new capabilities 
and opportunities for transnational criminals.  Compounding the complexity of 
this quandary is the proliferation of “politically fragile or failing states,”254 a 
phenomenon that allows transnational criminals to exploit “globally vulnerable 
areas with weak governments and resurgent ethnic and regional conflicts.”255  
Responding to the problem of transnational crime, states have gravitated 
toward military responses and exploited the legal fact that international law 
permits military action extraterritorially in certain circumstances while civilian 
law enforcement agents must almost invariably operate in a far more regulated 
legal universe.  The U.S. response to transnational crime, in particular, has 
frequently taken on the characteristics of military action—a trend that has 
worried policymakers and senior military officials.  This dangerous trend 
undermines military readiness, can have counterproductive effects on crime 
control and political stability in affected areas,256 and poses dangers to 
democratic principles and the rule of law by eschewing the legal protections of 
both domestic law and international human rights law.   
Military responses will, obviously, remain appropriate choices for 
many problems and threats faced by modern states.  But as both transnational 
crime and failed states burgeon, the prospect of an increasingly militarized 
approach to transnational crime—one that obviates basic domestic and 
international legal protections—is a troubling one.  To permit the 
encroachment of a rights-eclipsing legal regime into ordinary criminal matters, 
the domestic sphere, and an increasingly broad category of affairs portends 
ominously for democratic regimes.257  Policymakers should, therefore, take 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 MANDEL, supra note 13, at 21. 
255 Id. at 23 (footnote omitted). 
256 Id. at 163. 
257 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
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caution to ensure that the law of war remains a positive force that imbues an 
otherwise chaotic and lawless battlefield with an element of humanity and 
constraint, thereby “alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war,”258 
rather than acting as a corrosive element that serves to blight existing rights 
and protections in the domestic sphere.   
To that end, the trend of militarization in the U.S. approach to 
transnational crime could be reversed to a degree if international law 
recognized a greater degree of flexibility for certain limited categories of 
extraterritorial law enforcement actions by civilian actors.  Though the use of 
civilian law enforcement would certainly mean greater restrictions on 
international activity in many situations, as Lord Acton poignantly noted, the 
fate of every democracy depends on the choice it makes between “absolute 
power on the one hand, and on the other the restraints of legality and the 
authority of tradition.”259  Permitting an exception to the prohibition on 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction would represent the triumph of legality 
over loosely constrained force.  And that, after all, is the raison d’être of 
international law.260  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
The interest of the man must be connected to the constitutional rights of the 
place.  It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be 
necessary to control the abuses of government.  But what is government 
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?  If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.  In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the 
great difficulty lies in this:  you must first enable the government to control 
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.  A dependence 
on the people is, no doubt the primary control on the government; but 
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. 
 
258 DINSTEIN, supra note 170, at 9 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War, of Explosive 
Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weights). 
259 LORD ACTON, POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1861), reprinted 
in 1 SELECTED WRITINGS OF LORD ACTON: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF LIBERTY 216, 216 (J. 
Rufus Fears ed., Liberty Classics 1985). 
260 See NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 20, at 1 (footnote omitted) (“It is the raison d'être of 
international law to bring power under law.”).  See also ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (1947) (“And there is tremendous drama in the eventful 
struggle of statesmen and thinkers to substitute among nations the rule of law for untrammeled 
brutality—a struggle which, even where unsuccessful, has been inspired and exalted by the 
noblest motives of mankind.”). 
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ECOWAS’S RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE TO INSTALL 
ALASSANE OUATTARA AS PRESIDENT-ELECT 
 






On January 6, 2011, President-elect Alassane Ouattara of Côte 
d’Ivoire requested the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) to intervene in order to remove incumbent Laurent 
Gbagbo, who refused to leave power following the democratic 
presidential elections of November 2010.  In December 2010, 
ECOWAS gave a final ultimatum to Laurent Gbagbo to comply with its 
request on ceding his throne.  Otherwise, ECOWAS warned, it would 
be compelled to use legitimate force to serve the demands of the 
Ivorian people.  This Article ascertains the illegality of a military 
intervention for pro-democratic motives in light of the current post-
election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.  ECOWAS could not have lawfully 
intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in order to install Alassane Ouattara 
because such use of military force contravenes the U.N. Charter, and 
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 The right to intervene using military force by a regional organization 
for pro-democratic motives animates heated debate among international legal 
scholars.  Indeed, many seemingly irreconcilable issues arise when assessing 
the legality of such an intervention without prior blessing from the United 
Nations (U.N.) Security Council.  The question was raised on January 6, 2011, 
when President-elect Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire requested the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervene in order 
to remove incumbent Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to leave power following 
the presidential elections of November 2010.1  
In order to ascertain the legality of a pro-democratic intervention (PDI) 
in light of the recent post-electoral context of Côte d’Ivoire, Part I of this 
Article exposes the facts behind the escalation of turmoil and the request for an 
ECOWAS involvement.  Part II subsequently lays out the legal framework 
under the U.N. Charter to which military force conducted by a regional 
organization needs to abide.  To that end, the U.N. Charter provides that no 
such intervention can occur lawfully without prior authorization from the 
Security Council.  In the present Ivoirian case, no such authorization was 
granted.  Thus, other avenues advocating for a lawful use of force despite the 
Security Council’s lack of approval have been proffered by legal scholarship.  
These include the right to intervene under the PDI doctrine, which will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Opposition to Ivory Coast’s Gbagbo Eroding: ECOWAS, AGENCE FR. PRESSE 
ENGLISH WIRE, Feb. 8, 2011, available at WL NewsRoom. 
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discussed in Part III.  Part IV presents the proposal for a lawful intervention 
pursuant to a developed African regional custom that would translate as 
meeting the requirements of Article 53 of the U.N. Charter.2   
Further, Part V of this Article is divided in two sections.  The first 
section of Part V argues issues of consent expressed following the paradigm of 
intervention by invitation.  Proponents of military intervention by a regional 
organization argue that the de jure head of state, here President-elect Ouattara, 
can lawfully request and invite foreign military intervention.  Conversely, 
adherents of the opposing view contend that only the head of state in effective 
control (de facto), incumbent Gbagbo, can legally request military action.  
Unfortunately, international law is not clear in that regard.  The second section 
discusses the views that no such Security Council authorization is required 
because Côte d’Ivoire has consented to military intervention by adhering to the 
ECOWAS treaties, which permit the use of force in order to restore democracy 
and peace in the region.  Finally, Part VI of this Article concludes with a 
necessity argument, suggesting that ECOWAS is not the best-suited actor to 
intervene if such intervention were to be found lawful.  
This Article overall concludes that ECOWAS could not have lawfully 
intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in order to install Alassane Ouattara because such 
use of military force contravenes the U.N. Charter, and permitting such 
derogation would destabilize international peace and security.  This is not to 
say however, that there is no need in international law to search for a lawful 
compromise between the economy of the U.N. Charter and the human reality 




Côte d’Ivoire plunged into civil turmoil in September 2002 when 
subversive soldiers attempted to overthrow President Laurent Gbagbo.3  
Although the coup failed, it led to the outbreak of wide-scale civil conflict 
taking its roots in the ten-year-old animosity that has existed between the 
Muslim population of the North and the Christian and Animist populations of 
the South.4  In late 2002, de facto partition of the country resulted from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 U.N. Charter art. 53 (“[N]o enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council,” with 
certain exceptions.). 
3 See Jeremy I. Levitt, Pro-Democratic Intervention in Africa, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 785, 
808–09 (2006) [hereinafter Levitt, PDI in Africa]. 
4 Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2008), PLOUGHSHARES (Jan. 2009), http://ploughshares.ca/
pl_armedconflict/cote-divoire-2002-2008/ [hereinafter PLOUGHSHARES].  A major source of 
this tension is the perceived discrimination of northerners, who contend that they have been 
politically marginalized for years.  They have been denouncing their isolation since the 
exclusion of Alassane Ouattara, originally a popular northern politician, from the 2000 
presidential election.  The presence of large numbers of immigrants within Côte d’Ivoire has 
escalated inter-ethnic tensions and instigated the racist “Ivoirité” movement.  “Ivoirité” means 
